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 1 
GET ON BOARD FOR THE RIDE OF YOUR LIFE!  THE UPS , THE DOWNS, THE TWISTS, AND THE 
TURNS OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE “GATEKEEPER” FUNCTION TO SCIENTIFIC AND NON-
SCIENTIFIC EXPERT EVIDENCE : KUMHO’S EXPANSION OF DAUBERT 
 
“No one will deny that the law should in some way effectively use expert knowledge 
wherever it will aid in settling disputes.  The only question is as to how it can do so 
best.”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The prosecution proceeds with its case by calling Dr. Evan Wilson.2  On the witness stand, 
Dr. Wilson is deemed an expert in congenital diseases.3  With an impressive curriculum vitae, Dr. 
Wilson testifies that he has tailored his research, experimentation, and publications to cystic fibrosis.4 
 In another courtroom, the prosecution announces that its next witness is Detective Charles Smith, an 
expert in gang5 formalities.  Detective Smith testifies that his 22 years on the force have provided him 
                                                 
1  Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. 
REV.  40, 40 (1901). 
2  This is a fictitious fact pattern presented for illustrative purposes only. 
3 A “congenital disease” is one that  “result[s] from one’s hereditary or prenatal environment.”  
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 308-09 (College ed. 1966).  
4  Cystic fibrosis, also known as mucoviscidosis, is a hereditary disorder which attacks the respiratory 
and digestive systems.  See Cystic Fibrosis Index of On-line Resources (last modified Oct. 25, 1998) 
<http://vmsb.csd.mu.edu/~5418ukasr/cystic.html>. This disease affects the exocrine (mucus and sweat) glands 
and results in thick mucus formation in the lungs which subjects the individual to chronic lung infections.  See id. 
 It occurs in approximately one in 2500 Caucasians and usually appears in early childhood.  See Cystic Fibrosis 
(visited on Mar. 1, 2000) 
<http://health.yahoo.com/health/Diseases_and_Conditions/Disease_Feed_Data/Cystic_Fibrosis>.  There is no 
cure for cystic fibrosis and death usually occurs as a result of pulmonary complications.  Id.  About half of those 
children infected with this disease live beyond the age of twenty, and only a few live beyond the age of thirty-
five.  Id. 
5 A gang can be defined as a group of three or more individuals with the following three characteristics: 
(1) they share a common identity, usually through a gang name; (2) they adopt and use certain signs, symbols 
and/or colors; and (3) they individually or collectively engage in criminal activity.  Robert Walker, Gangs or Us 
(visited on Mar. 1, 2000) <http://www.gangsorus.com/>. 
1
Morsek: Scientific and Non-Scientifc Expert Evidence
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001
 
 2 
with numerous occasions to witness gang initiations6 and gang meetings.   
Despite the categorization of these witnesses as “experts,”7 there is a subtle distinction 
between them: Dr. Wilson is an expert in a scientific field, whereas Detective Smith is an expert in a 
non-scientific field.8  At first glance, this distinction does not seem relevant; however, the scientific 
and non-scientific distinction has created turmoil in the courts’ determination of the admissibility of 
                                                 
6 Joining a gang it is often referred to as “blood in - blood out,” which means that in order to join the 
gang, the individual must either shed his own blood or someone else’s blood.  Id.  There are many activities that a 
gang may use to induct an individual into the gang.  Id.  Some of the activities used as initiation include: (1) “beat 
in,” which involves the inductee proving his self -worth by enduring a severe beating by other gang members for 
a certain period of time; (2) armed robbery, where the inductee must commit an armed robbery and possibly shoot 
the victim for no reason; (3) “sex in,” where female inductees have intercourse with multiple members of the gang 
(this may be in lieu of a beating); (4) murder, where the inductee must murder an innocent victim, a rival gang 
member, or a police officer. Id.  An individual may also incur a violent response if he wants to leave the gang 
because most gangs require a lifetime membership.  Id.  Often the individual may be forced to endure a “beat out” 
or some may even face death, also known as “blood out.”  Id. 
7  “In this modern age, an ‘expert’ is found in any field, no matter how esoteric.  The cost may be high to 
employ the exp ert, but it may well be higher not to employ one.  Indeed, counsel who chooses to proceed without 
an expert may be flirting with malpractice.”  Id.  (quoting Melvin Belli, a famed criminal lawyer).   
As our society continues to grow and advance in the technological and scientific areas, there will be 
many new areas that will be unfamiliar to the average juror; hence, the utilization of experts will become even more 
prevalent.  See Edson McClellan, Comment, Sharpening the Focus on Daubert’s  Distinction Between Scientific 
and Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1719, 1721 (1997) (stating that the use of expert 
testimony has increased proportionately with the increase in technology in society).  The classified section of the 
September, 1999 issue of the American Bar Journal, which was comprised of 162 advertisements, 119 of which 
were advertisements from experts soliciting work, illustrates the expansion of the use of experts.  Id.  The array of 
expertise varied from construction consultants to bicycle accident reconstruction artists to airplane cabin injury 
investigators.  Id. 
8  To differentiate between scientific and non-scientific experts, some scholars have stated that judges 
should determine whether the expert testimony is testable.  See David L. Faigman, Making the Law Safe for 
Science: A Proposed Rule for the Admission of Expert Testimony, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 401, 407 (1996).  These 
scholars believe that this would be the appropriate indicator because testability is a strong indicator of whether 
something is scientific.  See KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989).  However, in theory, replication is possible with almost any expert testimony, either 
scientific or non-scientific.  See Kimberly M. Hrabosky, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael: Stretching Daubert  Beyond 
Recognition, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 203, 229 (1999).  Instead, the courts should look to the underlying body of 
knowledge supporting the expert’s testimony to determine if its foundation is  scientific or non-scientific.  Id. 
2
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expert testimony.9   
Although the expert10 witness is a valuable tool in our judicial system,11 judges continue to 
grapple with the admissibility of their testimony at trial, and often struggle with the proper admissibility 
standard to apply to both scientific and non-scientific expert testimony.12  Without an expert’s 
assistance, many complicated and obscure topics would not receive a proper and correct 
explanation.13  Despite the necessity of expert testimony, the admissibility of this testimony must 
                                                 
9  The difference between scientific and non-scientific evidence primarily stems from where the expert 
received his or her expertise in a particular field.  Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing 
a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring Reliability of Non-Scientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2271, 2289 (1999) (“Nonscientific experts are ‘experientially qualified.’  Their experience largely is their 
expertise.”).  See also  Jennifer Laser, Note, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application of Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1379, 1415 (1997) 
(“Many nonscientific experts derive their expertise from years of experience in a particular field.”). 
10  An “expert” is a person who has special skills or knowledge in a field.  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD 
DICTIONARY 512 (College ed. 1966).  See also  KATHEY M. VERDEAL, THE FIVE DIMENSIONS OF SCIENTIFIC 
TESTIMONY 121 (Carl B. Meyer ed. 1999) (articulating that an expert must not only be an expert in a particular field, 
but also an expert communicator and an expert persuader). 
There are many different fields in which an expert can belong.  Marilee M. Kapsa and Carl B. Meyer, 
Scientific Experts: Making Their Testimony More Reliable, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 313, 315 (1999).  Moreover, 
various fields, such as medicine, law, and engineering, require one to obtain a license before one is able to 
practice.  See American Board of Preventive Medicine Inc., (last modified Mar. 22, 2000)  
<http://www.abprevmed.org/infobook.htm> (outlining the requirements to become certified, such as graduating 
from an accredited medical school, holding an active license as a physician, some postgraduate training and 
experience, and at least two years of practically full-time training or practice in the speciality field). 
11  The scientific expert witness was first used during the Roman Empire.  SUETONIUS, THE LIVES OF THE 
CAESARS BOOK I, 111-13 (J.C. Rolfe trans. 1960).  The first documented forensic report appears to be that of 
Antisius, who was asked to examine the corpse of Julius Caesar and opined that only one of the twenty-three 
sword wounds was deadly, specifically the one perforating his thorax.  Id.   
The use of expert witnesses is necessary as our society continues to make advances in scientific, 
technological, and other various areas.  See McClellan, supra  note 7, at 1721 (asserting that the use of expert 
testimony has increased proportionately with the increase in technology in society). 
12  See infra  notes 37-43, 51, 62-71 and accompanying text. 
13  See Kristina L. Needham, Note, Questioning the Admissibility of Nonscientific Testimony After 
Daubert: The Need for Increased Judicial Gatekeeping to Ensure the Reliability of All Expert Testimony, 25 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541, 545 (1998) (stating that experts are an invaluable tool who clarify and illustrate complex 
issues for judges and juries).  See also  Kapsa, supra  note 10, at 318 (stating that experts have specialized 
3
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nonetheless be reconciled with the relevancy and reliability requirements for all types of evidence.14   
However, it is not clear whether both scientific and non-scientific expert testimony should be held to 
the same reliability and relevancy standards.15   
To resolve this issue, the United States Supreme Court embarked on a journey to create 
standards for admitting both scientific and non-scientific expert testimony.16  The evolution of this 
                                                                                                                                                         
education and skills and some must even obtain professional licenses, thus illustrating that their expertise 
surpasses the knowledge of layman). 
However, it should be noted that there is a significant difference between the quest for truth in the 
laboratory as compared to the quest for truth in the courtroom.  See Nicholas Targ and Elise Feldman, Courting 
Science: Expert Testimony After Daubert  and Carmichael, 33 NAT. RESOURCES AND ENV’T 507, 507 (1999).  
Scientific results are continually reviewed and revamped; whereas, the law does not have this luxury.  Id.  Legal 
issues are generally subjected to a time constraint which results in a quick and final resolution.  Id.  Thus, science 
may only provide a present understanding, not certainty.  Id.  Law demands from science certainty at a specific 
time.  Id.  Hence, judges rather than the “scientific community” determine the quality of scientific evidence that is 
admitted into evidence.  Id.  Despite a judge’s lack of expertise in the scientific arena, a judge has the expertise to 
satisfy the goals and standards of the legal system.  Id.  Thus, “good” scientific evidence relates to our goals and 
standards in the judicial system, which may not be the values of the scientific community.  Id. 
14  Determining the reliability of an expert witness’ testimony, two questions must be asked: (1) is the 
expert qualified to give an opinion?; and (2) is the expert reliable?  See Kapsa, supra  note 10, at 318.  The latter 
question, a question of fact, was generally determined by the jury.  Id.  However, with the advent of Daubert, 
Joiner, and Kumho, this determination rests in the hands of the judge.  Id.      
15  Judges required the proponent of scientific expert testimony to show that it was reliable before it 
would be admitted; however, this heightened scrutiny was not applied to non-scientific expert testimony.  See 
Hrabosky, supra  note 8, at 205.  The proponents of non-scientific expert testimony must merely satisfy the 
traditional relevancy rule that the testimony must assist the trier of fact.  Id.  In contrast, scientific expert 
testimony was subject to a more rigorous analysis under the Frye “general acceptance” test.  Id.;  see also  John 
William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony, Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of 
Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 362-63 (1992) (“The two rules (McCormick  relevancy and 
Frye test) operated in two almost mutually exclusive areas, the one being applied to expert testimony and the 
other to what was called ‘scientific evidence’ ”);  Imwinkelried, supra note 9, at 2280-81(stating that most courts 
“adopted a laissez-faire attitude toward the reliability of the propositions underlying non-scientific expert 
testimony”). 
16  See infra  notes 88-96.  The Supreme Court is not the only entity that requires a heightened level of 
detail in regards to expert testimony.  Lee Radford, Developments in the Law of Evidence Relating to 
Governmental Scientific Issues, 42 ADVOC. 15, 16 (1999).  Specifically, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require 
“a written report prepared and signed by the witness” which must include “a complete statement of all opinions to 
be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor” and “the data or other information considered by the witness in 
forming the opinions.”  FED. R. CIV.  P. 26(a)(2)(B).  Hence, these reports must provide not only conclusions, but 
also a detailed explanation of the rationale for those conclusions.  See Radford, supra  at 16.  Complying with Rule 
4
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journey, as demonstrated by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.,17 General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner,18 and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,19 illustrates the Court’s recognition that 
all admissible expert testimony must achieve a certain level of reliability and relevance.20 
This Comment examines the history of scientific and non-scientific expert evidence,21 its 
current status,22 and the future of scientific and non-scientific evidence based on recent court 
decisions.23  Part II explores the background of these issues by examining the earlier standard for 
admitting expert testimony,24 the effect of Congress’ promulgation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence,25 and the influential cases in this area.26  Part III analyzes the importance of subjecting non-
scientific expert testimony to the same rigors as scientific expert testimony.27  Lastly, Part IV predicts 
                                                                                                                                                         
26(a)(2)(B) will assist those experts in overcoming the Daubert reliability requirements by focusing the court’s 
attention on the scientific theories advanced, and thus demonstrating the basis of their conclusions.  Id. 
17 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see infra  Part II.C. 
18 General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); see infra  Part II.D. 
19  Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); see infra  Part II.E. 
20  See infra Parts II-IV. 
21  See infra  Part II. 
22  See infra  Part III. 
23  See infra  Part IV. 
24  See infra  notes 37-43, 49-51 and accompanying text.   
25  See infra  notes 52-58 and accompanying text.   
26  See infra  notes 59-96 and accompanying text.   
27  See infra  notes 97-144 and accompanying text.   
5
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the future of expert evidence.28 
II. BACKGROUND 
In an effort to understand the impact of Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho on the field of expert 
testimony, it is imperative to examine the factors that led the United States Supreme Court to address 
this particular issue.29  The controversy began with Frye v. United States,30 a decision from the 
District of Columbia that outlined a test for admitting expert testimony.31  Many years later, Congress 
enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, which also provided guidance for the admission of expert 
testimony.32  Confusion erupted because Evidence Rule 702 clashed with the decision in Frye.33    
A. The General Acceptance Test in Frye 
From the middle of the 19th century until the beginning of the 20th century, the general 
standard for determining the admissibility of expert testimony rested on the assumption that experts 
had superior knowledge and training.34  The court imputed this expertise to the expert based on his 
                                                 
28  See infra  notes 145-155 and accompanying text.   
29  See infra  Part II.A., II.B. 
30  See infra  Part II.A. 
31  See infra  notes 36-43 and accompanying text.   
32  See infra  Part II.B. 
33  See infra  notes 50-58 and accompanying text.   
34  Even recent cases illustrate that the courts routinely permit testimony from witnesses who qualify as 
experts because of their specialized knowledge or experience.  See Moran v. Ford Motor Co., 476 F.2d 289, 291 (8th 
Cir. 1973) (holding that an owner and operator of a body and fender shop who had been in the auto repair 
business for eighteen years and who had frequently examined wrecked cars possessed sufficient knowledge and 
practical experience to testify as to whether a particular ball joint of the car’s suspension system was defective);  
Stempel v. Chrysler Corp., 495 F.2d 1247, 1248 (5th Cir. 1974) (allowing a professional engineer who had 
6
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or her qualifications and success in his or her profession.35  Despite the lack of any  blatant problems 
with this standard, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Frye v. United States,36 
enunciated a test for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.37   
                                                                                                                                                         
investigated approximately 1,800 accidents involving vehicles testify on the design of a padded dashboard, even 
though he had no practical experience in designing automobile dashboards himself);  Rocky Mountain 
Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d 907, 919 (10th Cir. 1986) (authorizing a witness, who had a 
doctorate degree in metallurgical engineering and experience investigating helicopter accidents, to testify as to 
the faulty design in a helicopter rotor);  Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 235-36 (3d Cir. 1964) 
(permitting an assistant chief flight engineer with eleven years of experience, who had investigated approximately 
thirty cases of airplane engine overspeed and had reviewed hundreds of other cases in air force reports, testify as 
an expert in an airplane crash case).  See also  Imwinkelried, supra note 9, at 2278 (listing numerous experts who 
gained their specialized knowledge through experience, including auctioneers, bankers, railroad brakeman, 
business persons, carpenters, farmers, security guards, and trapshooters). 
35  The courts have traditionally viewed expert testimony with skepticism.  See Hrabosky, supra  note 8, 
at 204.  At common law, the courts’ skepticism stemmed from the belief that any witness willing to come forward 
to testify had biases towards one of the parties.  See Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert’s Debut: The Supreme Court, the 
Economics of Scientific Evidence, and the Adversarial System, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 9 (1995).  However, with 
the advent of various institutional safeguards (i.e., impeachment, cross-examination, and the personal-knowledge 
rule), the courts’ skepticism toward testimonial evidence abated.  Id. at 10-11.  With this confidence in the 
adversarial system and the evidentiary standards, the courts accepted the need for testimonial evidence.  Id. 
36  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  The defendant was subjected to a systolic blood 
pressure deception test (“lie detector test”) prior to trial.  Id. at 1013.  Defendant’s attorney then sought to offer, 
as an expert, the scientist who conducted the test on the defendant to testify as to the results.  Id. at 1014.  
However, the trial court did not permit his testimony.  Id.  Defense counsel then proffered to have the scientist 
conduct the test in the presence of the jury.  Id. The court also refused this evidence.  Id. The defendant was then 
convicted of murder.  Id.  The defendant appealed his conviction based on the exclusion of the expert testimony, 
but to no avail.  Id.  The appellate court affirmed his conviction because it did not believe that the systolic blood 
pressure deception test had gained significant scientific recognition.  Id. 
37  The Frye test was primarily created to ensure that the courts were admitting reliable scientific 
evidence.  See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“The requirement of general 
acceptance in the scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a 
scientific method will have the determinative voice.”).  See also  People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171 (Mich. 1977).  
The Court stated: 
It therefore is best to adhere to a standard [Frye] which in effect permits the experts who know 
 most about a procedure to experiment and to study it.  In effect, they form a kind of technical  
jury, which must first pass on the scientific status of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in 
making its findings of fact. 
Id. at 194.   
Additional rationales for the creation of the Frye test include: (1) promotion of uniform decisions by 
eliminating differing judicial interpretations; and (2) preventing the placement of too much emphasis on the 
scientific evidence to determine its validity.  See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976) (stating that “it 
may well promote a degree of uniformity of decision.”);  Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72 (Md. 1978) (declaring 
7
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In Frye, the Court stated that the trial judge must determine whether the scientific evidence at 
issue had gained sufficient recognition in the scientific community to justify admitting the evidence.38 
This standard required judges to differentiate among scientific principles that had attained sufficient 
recognition and scientific principles that had not achieved this status.39  The Court articulated what is 
known as the “general acceptance”40 test, which requires a two-part analysis: (1) identifying the field 
in which the underlying principle falls;41 and (2) determining whether the proffered evidence is 
                                                                                                                                                         
that “without the Frye test or something similar, the reliability of an experimental scientific technique is likely to 
become a central issue in each trial in which it is introduced.”). 
38  Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
39  In determining whether a scientific principle has garnered general acceptance, the burden of proof lies 
with the proponent.  Murray v. State, 692 So.2d 157, 161 (Fla. 1997).  The proponent generally illustrates 
acceptance of the scientific theory via expert testimony.  See PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 23 (3d ed. 1999).  Despite the proponent’s ability to use expert testimony, various courts 
have applied additional qualifications.  One qualification includes the use of corroborating evidence.  See Kelly, 
549 P.2d at 1248 (questioning “whether the testimony of a single witness alone is ever sufficient to represent, or 
attest to, the views of an entire scientific community regarding the reliability of a new technique”);  
Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Pa. 1977) (holding that the “testimony of one expert . . . cannot 
satisfy [the Frye] standard”).  Other courts require that impartial experts testify as to the general acceptance of a 
scientific theory.  See People v. Tobey, 257 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Mich. 1977) (rejecting scientific evidence because 
expert who testified as to its general acceptance was not “disinterested and impartial”). 
Another method a proponent could use to illustrate general acceptance of a scientific theory is scientific 
and legal publications.  See Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 713 A.2d 1117, 1126-27 (Pa. 1998) (allowing the 
Commonwealth to use evidence which included citations to numerous scientific texts and journals). 
40  Although the Court articulated the “general acceptance” test, it failed to succinctly define what the 
test entailed.  See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States , A Half-
Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1208 (1980) (citing cases applying the Frye test and demonstrating the 
courts’ divergence in interpreting what constituted “general acceptance”).  Compare People v. Williams, 331 P.2d 
251 (Cal. 1958) (upholding the admissibility of evidence because the test had “been generally accepted by those 
who would be expected to be familiar with its use”) with United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (holding voiceprint evidence inadmissible because it had not been accepted by the “scientific community as 
a whole”).   
41 See People v. Collins, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (“At the threshold of determining 
whether the technique meets the test of acceptance in the scientific community, is the question of defining that 
community.”).  See also  State v. Jones, 922 P.2d 806, 809 (Wash. 1996) (en banc) (“[T]he relevant inquiry, 
however, is acceptance by scientists, not by the courts or legal commentators.”).  However, determining the 
proper scientific field may be difficult because many scientific techniques do not fall into only one specific field.  
8
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generally accepted in this field.42  The Court stated the “general acceptance” test as follows: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere in this 
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts 
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized 
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained acceptance in a particular field in which it 
belongs.43  
                                                                                                                                                         
Giannelli, supra  note 40, at 1208.  Professor Giannelli stated: 
 
Deciding what is the proper field to which a novel test belongs is in itself a chore.  Most novel 
tests represent new approaches to the solution of old problems by a process which is unknown, 
or belongs to a different field.  Because of this, the person developing a novel test frequently 
finds himself on the fringes of his scientific discipline and perhaps overlapping into other 
disciplines. 
  
Id. at 1208 n.68 (quoting Professor Moenssens).  See also  Jeffrey D. Menicucci, Comment, Stylistic Evidence in 
the Trial of Patricia Hearst, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 399 (1977) (“A discipline such as stylistics contains elements 
from many established sciences - such as mathematics, computer science, psychology, and linguistics . . . .”). 
42  In determining whether the proffered evidence is generally accepted in its field, one must discern what 
constitutes general acceptance in a particular field.  See J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 164 (2d ed. 
1974) (opining that the Frye standard requires acceptance by a “substantial majority”).  The “substantial 
majority” standard should be differentiated from the “substantial acceptance” test, which has been utilized by 
some courts, because acceptance may be substantial without representing a majority of scientists in a particular 
field.  See United States v. Williams, 443 F.Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating acceptance by a “substantial 
section of the scientific community”);  Commonwealth v. Devlin, 310 N.E.2d. 353, 356 n.3 (Mass. 1974) (stating 
“substantial authority” required). 
43  Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  The “general acceptance” test has infiltrated a multitude of fields.  See United 
States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying Frye to forward looking infrared system); United States 
v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing Frye to aid in the determination of the admissibility of 
voiceprint evidence);  United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 1970) (using Frye to determine 
admissibility of neutron activation analysis); Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1956) (applying 
Frye standard to the use of sodium pentothal); United States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (using 
Frye with chromatographic analysis of ink);   People v. Palmer, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (1978) (citing Frye when 
evaluating the scanning electron microscopic analysis); People v. Slone, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 68 (1978) (utilizing Frye 
with bitemark comparison evidence); People v. Lauro, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (citing Frye to 
9
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 10 
This “general acceptance” test provided the first procedural barrier to the admission of 
scientific evidence and expert testimony.44  Under this test, some evidence or testimony may have 
been excluded if it was not generally accepted in its particular field.45  This resulted in an impediment 
to the introduction of novel evidence that had not had time to gain acceptance in its respective field.46 
                                                                                                                                                         
determine admissibility of trace metal detection technique);  State v. Smith, 362 N.E.2d 1239, 1246 (Ohio 1976) 
(citing Frye to declare that Harrison-Gilroy technique, which applies to gunshot residue tests, is not generally 
accepted); Watson v. State, 219 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Wis. 1974) (utilizing Frye when evaluating hair analysis); Rivers 
v. Black, 68 So.2d 2, 4 (Ala. 1953) (applying Frye to drunkometer). 
44  See Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Reliability of Scientific Technique and its Acceptance Within 
Scientific Community as Affecting Admissibility, at Federal Trial, of Expert Testimony as to Result of Test or 
Study Based on Such Technique – Modern Cases, 105 A.L.R. FED. 299, 317-19 (1991 & 1999 Supp.).  The Frye 
“general acceptance” test effectively protects against the possibility of prejudicial effects of testimony which is 
based on unproven hypothesis.  Id.  However, this test is too vague and excludes a lot of probative information 
from the jury’s evaluation.  See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985). 
45  See, e.g., Paul B. Tyler, The Kelly-Frye “General Acceptance” Standard Remains the Rule for 
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: People v. Leahy, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1274, 1275-76 (1995) (stating that the 
“general acceptance” standard was stringent and may exclude novel, but nevertheless valid, expert knowledge); 
see also  United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that the Frye test retards admission 
of proof based on new methods of investigation by requiring that they attain sufficient currency and status to 
gain general acceptance). 
46  Regardless of the widespread judicial acceptance, the Frye test has come under attack for varying 
reasons.  See generally GIANNELLI, supra  note 39, at 27.  One criticism of the Frye test concerns the determination 
of what should be categorized as “scientific” for purposes of this test.  See 22 C. WRIGHT and K. GRAHAM, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 87 n.10 (1977) (“What is ‘scientific evidence’ to which the test applies?  When 
a witness testifies that he saw the defendant throw a rock at the victim, the inferences to be drawn from this 
testimony involve a number of principles of physics, but few courts would apply the Frye test.”)  The Supreme 
Court of Iowa succinctly stated the difficulty in ascertaining what “scientific” evidence is: 
 
Despite [the Frye test’s] apparent simplicity, distinguishing “scientific” evidence from other 
areas of expert testimony is a difficult determination in many instances . . . .  The instant case 
illustrates this difficulty of classifying evidence as scientific or non-scientific.  The defendant 
says the study of  blood flight characteristics is itself a science.  The witness, on the other 
hand, testified it was based primarily upon physics and mathematics, which impart accuracy and 
predictability to the study. 
 
State v. Hall, 297 N.W. 2d 80, 85 (Iowa 1980) (citations omitted). 
Critics also argue that the Frye test serves as a barrier to the admission of reliable evidence.  See 
Symposium, Introduction to New Scientific Methods in Court, LAW ENFORCEMENT , SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 957, 
958 (S.A. Yefsky ed. 1967) (“A literal reading of Frye v. United States would require that the courts always await 
the passing of a ‘cultural lag’ during which period the new method will have had sufficient time to diffuse through 
10
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 This inability to address new theories contributed to Frye’s extinction, but more importantly it 
demonstrated the difficulties in devising the proper test for determining the admissibility of expert 
testimony.47   
B. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
In 1975, Congress promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence in an effort to create a 
universal set of rules for judges and attorneys to apply to evidentiary matters.48  Despite Congress’ 
good intentions when it codified the rules, discord erupted in relation to Rule 702,49 which deals with 
                                                                                                                                                         
scientific discipline and create the requisite body of scientific opinion needed for acceptability.”).  See also  
Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68, 75 (Fla. App. 1968) (Mann, J. concurring) (“[S]ociety need not tolerate homicide 
until there develops a body of medical literature about some particular lethal agent.”). 
Although Frye has many critics, it also has proponents who support its validity.  These proponents 
proffer three arguments in defense of the Frye “general acceptance” test: (1) the test guarantees that “a minimal 
reserve of experts exists who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case”;   
(2) the test promotes uniformity in decisions; and (3) the test eliminates time-consuming hearings to determine the 
validity of innovative techniques.  United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing the first 
rationale behind maintaining the Frye test);  People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976) (articulating the 
second reason for maintaining the Frye test);  Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371 (Md. 1978) (“Without the Frye test 
or something similar, the reliability of an experimental scientific technique is likely to become a central issue in 
each trial in which it is introduced, as long as there remains serious disagreement in the scientific community over 
its reliability.”). 
47  See infra  notes 50-76, 89-95 and accompanying text. 
48  Specifically, the Federal Rules of Evidence expanded the class of experts who may testify; expanded the 
subjects proper for expert testimony; expanded the formats in which an expert may testify; allowed experts to base 
their opinions on certain otherwise inadmissible evidence; and relaxed the requirement of disclosure of the basis of 
the expert’s testimony.  FED. R. EVID. 702-705. 
49  FED. R. EVID. 702.   Rule 702 states: “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”  Id. 
The language of Rule 702 expanded the admissibility of expert testimony in a multitude of ways.  See Major 
Victor Hansen, Rule of Evidence 702: The Supreme Court Provides a Framework for Reliability Determinations, 
162 MIL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1999).  First, the expert can testify on any subject without limitation.  Id. at 11.  Illustrative of 
this point is that the rule permits expert testimony on scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge.  Id.  Specialized 
knowledge encompasses a wide array of topics; hence, illustrating the expansive nature of this rule.  See United 
States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (permitting expert testimony on how pimps operate);  United States 
v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding expert testimony on head dimension measurements admissible);  
United States v. Cruz, 797 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1986) (allowing a government agent to testify about the use of food stamps 
11
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the admissibility of expert evidence.50  Specifically, the problem resulted because of Congress’ failure 
to incorporate into the text of Rule 702 the “general acceptance” test announced in Frye.51  
                                                                                                                                                         
in narcotics sales);  United States v. Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1984) (authorizing the demonstration of a drug 
sniffing dog). 
Additionally, Rule 702 requires that the party seeking to introduce the expert testimony show that it will 
assist the trier of fact.  See Hansen, supra , at 11.  This contributes to the expansion of expert testimony by eliminating 
the high standard of proof the admitting party must hurdle.  Id.  Moreover, the expert does not need to achieve his 
expertise via formal education.  Id.  The rule recognizes other methods of obtaining expertise: training, experience, 
knowledge, education, or skill.  Id.   
Also, Rule 701 promotes the expansive nature of Rule 702 by not restricting experts’ testimony to opinions.  
Id. at 12.  Before the enactment of Rule 702, experts were generally limited to opinion testimony.  Id.  Hence, with 
these liberalizations expert testimony will more frequently infiltrate the courtroom.  Id. 
50  In addition to Rule 702, there are numerous rules that the trial judge may use when evaluating expert 
testimony.  The trial judge must utilize Rule 401 which defines relevant evidence: “ ‘[r]elevant evidence’ means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  FED. R. EVID. 401.  The court must also 
look to Rule 403 which provides for a balancing test which weighs the relevance of the testimony against the unfair 
prejudice or confusion of the issues:  “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  FED. R. EVID. 403.   
Next, the judge could look to Rule 703 which outlines the foundational requirements of Rule 702: 
 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be 
those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.  If of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the 
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 
 
FED. R. EVID. 703.  Another rule that the judge can look to is Rule 706 which permits the court to appoint its own 
expert witness:    
 
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why 
expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations.  The 
court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert 
witnesses of its own selection.   
 
FED. R. EVID. 706(a). 
51 FED. R. EVID. 702.   Furthermore, Rule 703, the foundational requirement of Rule 702, fails to impose a 
“general acceptance” requirement.  See FED. R. EVID. 703.  See also  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
U.S. 579, 589 (1993).  In Daubert, the Court stated that: 
 
Given the Rules’ permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that 
does not mention “general acceptance,” the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is 
unconvincing.  Frye made “general acceptance” the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific 
testimony.  That austere standard, absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, should not me applied in federal trials. 
12
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Moreover, neither the Advisory Committee Notes to Congress,52 nor the legislators during floor 
debates made any mention of Frye or the “general acceptance” test.53  Because it failed to mention 
the “general acceptance” test when it enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress left the courts 
in a quandary.54  Do the courts continue to apply the test outline in Frye, or do they apply the newly 
enacted Federal Rules of Evidence?55  Some courts continued to apply the “general acceptance” 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
Id.; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of 
Juror Psychology, 100 MIL. L. REV. 99, 105 (1983) (“Nowhere is Frye codified.  You never see the phrase “general 
acceptance” in the context of the admissibility of scientific evidence anywhere in the Federal Rules.”). 
52  See Effie J. Chan, The “Brave New World” of Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial Peer Review, and 
Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 100, 108 (1995) (citing  PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SUPREME 
COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE’S NOTES , H.R. 5463 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT AND AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 116-17 (John R. Schmertz, Jr. ed. 1974)). See also  3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN and 
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 702[03], at 702-16 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (interpreting silence as 
abandonment of Frye and arguing that “the silence of Rule 702 and its drafters may arguably be regarded as 
tantamount to an abandonment of the general acceptance standard.”).  But see United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 
1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Neither the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the accompanying notes of the 
advisory committee . . . explicitly set forth the appropriate standard by which the admissibility of novel scientific 
evidence is to be established.”);  2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG and MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL 15 (5th ed. 1990) (interpreting silence as a retention of Frye and noting that “it was highly unlikely the 
Advisory Committee and the Congress intended to overrule the vast majority of cases excluding such evidence as lie 
detectors without explicitly stating so.”);  GIANNELLI, supra  note 39, at 28-29 (“The adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence has not resolved the uncertain status of the Frye test. . . . The issue is simply ignored in the Advisory 
Committee’s Notes, congressional committee reports, floor debates, and hearings.”); GIANNELLI, supra  note 39, at 29 
(“Proponents of Frye can argue that because Frye was the established rule prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules 
and because there is no indication in the legislative history suggesting that Frye has been superceded, the general 
acceptance test remains intact.”). 
53  See Chan, supra note 52, at 108 (citing 94th Cong., 1st Session, Federal Rules of Evidence: Text & 
Legislative History (Comm. Print 1975)). 
54  See infra  notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
55  See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying both the 
Frye test and the Federal Rules); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that “Rule 702 
and Frye both require the same general approach to the admissibility of new scientific evidence”); United States v. 
Gillespie, 853 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining that “evidence that does not qualify under Frye must be 
excluded”); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that “Frye is still the law in this Circuit”); 
United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing the Frye test as the proper standard for 
admissibility of evidence based on a novel scientific technique). 
13
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test, while others argued that the Federal Rules displaced the Frye test.56  In response to this lack of 
consistency, the United States Supreme Court finally broke its silence and articulated a formal 
standard for admitting expert evidence.57 
C. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
A watershed moment in the field of scientific evidence occurred when the United States 
Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals58 and announced that Rule 702 
                                                 
56  See supra  note 55; infra note 61 and accompanying text.  See also WEINSTEIN, supra  note 52, at 702-39 
n.12 (listing federal circuits that “still predicate the admission of scientific evidence on general acceptance in the 
community”).  See generally Richard B. Racine et al., The Battle Over Science in the Courtroom, 42 FED. LAW. 36, 38 
(1995) (illustrating the differing approaches used in the courts). 
57  See Giannelli, supra  note 40, at 1230 n.257.  Professor Giannelli states that:  
 
Even if a court found that Congress did not intend to overrule Frye by enacting the Federal Rules, 
the tension between Frye and the Federal Rules should, at the very least, cause some judicial 
reevaluation of the general acceptance standard.  Since Frye is a judicial creation and there is no 
evidence Congress intended to retain it, it could be overruled by the courts. 
Id.  See also Racine, supra  note 56, at 38.  Because the Frye test and Rule 702 use different standards to determine 
the admissibility of scientific evidence, the evidence admitted or excluded will vary greatly.  Id.  That is, under the 
Frye test some evidence may be admitted, whereas under Rule 702 the same evidence may be excluded.  Id.  This 
divergence in views was in need of a resolution and hence, Daubert was granted certiorari to resolve this dispute.  Id. 
58 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  This case erupted when two minor 
children and their parents sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  Id. at 582.  Both of these children were born with 
severe birth defects, which they allege resulted from their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug 
marketed by Merrell Dow.  Id.  Merrell Dow motioned for summary judgment claiming that Bendectin does not cause 
birth defects in humans.  Id.  To support its motion, Merrell Dow introduced an affidavit of a well-credentialed expert, 
who stated that he had reviewed all of the information published on Bendectin and that there was no evidence that 
Bendectin caused malformations in fetuses.  Id.  All of his information resulted from tests based on human statistics.  
Id.  To combat Merrell Dow’s expert, Daubert presented testimony of eight well-credentialed experts.  Id. at 583.  All 
of Daubert’s experts relied on animal-cell studies, live-animal studies, and chemical structure analysis.  Id.  The 
District Court granted Merrell Dow’s summary judgment motion because Daubert’s expert testimony failed to meet 
the “general acceptance” standard.  Id.  The Court reasoned that expert evidence, in regards to Bendectin, must be 
based on epidemiological evidence due to the significant amount of epidemiological data on the subject.  Id.  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision and declared that “expert opinion based on methodology that 
diverges ‘significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the field . . . cannot be shown to be 
generally accepted as reliable technique.’” Id. at 584. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the correct standard for admitting expert testimony.  Id. at 
585.  The Court determined that the “general acceptance” test, outlined in Frye, was no longer the proper test to 
determine the admissibility of expert testimony.  Id. at 587.  Specifically, the Court stated that the Federal Rules of 
14
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of the Federal Rules of Evidence59 superseded the 70-year-old Frye test.60  The Court thus 
displaced the “general acceptance” test and created a more elaborate analysis for admitting scientific 
                                                                                                                                                         
Evidence provide the proper standard to determine the admissibility of expert testimony.  Id. 
59  See supra  Part II.B. 
60  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.  The Court does take into consideration common law in its determination as to 
the applicability of later enacted federal rules.  Id. at 588.  However, upon examining Rule 702, there is no mention of 
“general acceptance” as a prerequisite to admissibility, nor is there any mention of Frye in the drafting history of 
Rule 702.  Id.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the Frye standard was incompatible with the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  Id.   
The Court’s determination, that Rule 702 superseded the Frye test, eliminated the pressing question of the 
viability of the “general acceptance” test in light of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  See Laser, supra  note 9, at 1380.  
Following the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, some courts continued to utilize the “general acceptance” 
test to determine the admissibility of scientific testimony; whereas, other courts stated that Rule 702 supersedes the 
“general acceptance” test.  Compare United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978)  (stating that the Frye test 
is superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979), with Christophersen v. Allied-
Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (implying that the Frye test and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence coexist), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992);  Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 304 n.15 (4th Cir. 
1984) (expressing concerns about Frye, but still continuing to apply it in certain circumstances);  Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031 n.9 (5th Cir. 1984) (continuing to apply Frye test even if its 
applicability after the Federal Rules is unresolved). 
Commentators have also been divided as to the applicability of the Frye test in light of the enactment of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  Compare WEINSTEIN, supra  note 52 , at  ¶ 702[03] (claiming that the Federal Rule’s failure 
to incorporate Frye indicates its abandonment), with M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE Sec. 703.2 (3rd 
ed. 1991) (maintaining that the Frye test lives);  1 D. LOUISELL and C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 818 (1977) (stating 
that Frye probably survives the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
State courts have also voiced their opinions as to the continuing viability of the Frye test.  Compare State 
v. Tankersley, 956 P.2d 486, 491 (Ariz. 1998) (“. . . [T]he state asks this court to abandon the Frye test in favor of the 
current federal [Daubert] standard for determining the admissibility of new scientific evidence . . . . [W]e decline to do 
so”);  State v. Johnson, 922 P.2d 294, 296 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc) (“[T]he Frye rule, which has been followed without 
causing significant problems because it was first adopted in 1962, remains the rule in Arizona.”);  Hayes v. State, 660 
So.2d 257, 262 (Fla. 1995) (“We have recently made it clear that Florida utilizes the Frye test . . . .”);  People v. Miller, 
670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (Ill. 1996) (“Illinois follows the Frye standard for the admission of novel scientific evidence.”); 
State v. Hill, 895 P.2d 1238, 1245 (Kan. 1995) (“Kansas has repeatedly applied Frye.”);  People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 
322, 324 (N.Y. 1996) (“This Court has often endorsed and applied the well-recognized rule of Frye . . . .”), with State v. 
Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 402-03 (Alaska 1999) (“We adopt the Daubert standard for determining the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.”);  Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Ky. 1995) (rejecting Frye in favor of 
Daubert);  Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328, 332 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (“The time is right for this court to abandon 
the Frye test and adopt the more structured and yet flexible admissibility standard set forth in Daubert”);  State v. 
Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482, 484 (S.D. 1994) (“General acceptance in the scientific community is no longer required”);  
State v. Begley, 956 S.W.2d 471, 475 n.9 (Tenn. 1997) (“McDaniel held that the pre-Rules of Evidence test of Frye . . . 
was superseded by the adoption of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 702 and 703.”).  
15
Morsek: Scientific and Non-Scientifc Expert Evidence
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001
 
 16 
expert testimony.61   Specifically, the Court cloaked trial judges in a “gatekeeping” robe to effectuate 
this new duty of ensuring both the relevancy62 and the reliability63 of scientific evidence.64  To assist 
                                                 
61  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-96. 
62  The relevance requirement is met when expert evidence relates to any issue in the case.  Id. at 591.  
Specifically, the courts must determine whether the evidence satisfies the Daubert “fit” or “helpfulness” requirement. 
  Radford, supra note 16, at 16.  The Supreme Court defined this “fit” or “helpfulness” requirement as that which 
“requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to its admis sibility.”  Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 592.  Because scientific testimony can be both “powerful and misleading,” the Supreme Court stated that the 
federal courts must go beyond the traditional Rule 402 requirement of relevance.  Id. at 595.  See also  FED. R. EVID. 402 
(“All relevant evidence is admissible, . . . .  Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”).  The federal courts 
must be “convinced that it speaks clearly and directly to an issue in dispute” before they will admit such scientific 
evidence.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (hereinafter Daubert II) 43 F.3d 1311, 1312 n.17 (9th Cir. 
1995).  
The relevancy or “fit” requirement has also resulted in differing applications among the courts.  See Targ, 
supra  note 13, at 511.  For example, in the Ninth Circuit the fit requirement is satisfied under a sufficiency standard 
rather than a relevancy standard.  See Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321.  The Court held that although the evidence was 
relevant, it did not sufficiently meet the legal standard of causation.  Id. at 1320.  The Court therefore exercised its 
“gatekeeper” role and excluded the evidence from trial.  Id.  In contrast, other circuits only require that the evidence 
meet a low threshold of relevance to satisfy the “fit” requirement.  See Targ, supra  note 13, at 511.  These circuits 
allow the jury to consider the evidence even if it does not meet the sufficiency standard.  See Maryland Cas. Co. v. 
Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 137 F.3d 780, 783 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that Daubert does not require the proffering party to 
prove that their expert’s assessments are correct, only that they are reliable);  Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 
134 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding an expert’s testimony admissible under Rule 702, so long as it fits an issue in the case, 
and after the expert explains his or her theories and has been subjected to cross-examination or other evidence 
demonstrating that his or her technique is not derived from the scientific method). 
See also  Manuel L. Real, Daubert - A Judge’s View, 28 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 211, 219 (1999).  Real notes that 
admissibility and sufficiency should not be confused.  Id.  Admissibility concerns “fit,” that is, “does the proffered 
opinion fit the facts of the case in the sense that does the opinion have any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact . . . ‘more probable than it would be without the evidence.’ ” Id.  See also  FED. R. EVID. 401.  Real defines 
sufficiency as a party’s satisfaction of its burden of proof, which is determined on a case-by-case basis.  See Real, 
supra , at 219.  
63  In the Ninth Circuit, the reliability requirement is defined as “some objective, independent validation of 
the expert’s methodology.”  Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1316.  This Circuit focuses more on the expert’s basis for the 
opinion rather than what he or she says in court.  Id.  See also  Michael B. Kent, Jr., Daubert, Doctors and Differential 
Diagnosis: Treating Medical Causation Testimony as Evidence, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 525, 528 (1999) (stating that 
“scientific knowledge” implies a basis in scienctific procedures and “knowledge” must be more that a subjective 
belief or unsupported speculation; therefore, an expert’s reliability is determined if his or her statements are elicited 
via the scientific method).   
The determination of reliability may be a difficult task.  Therefore, the courts have utilized various indicators 
of scientific unreliability to assist in their analyses.  See Radford, supra  note16, at 16.  Some of the factors the courts 
use include: (1) whether the expert alters the opinion or method in response to the opposing side’s challenges; (2) 
whether the expert discards data that contradicts his outcome; (3) whether the expert only chooses data that 
corroborates his theory; (4) whether the expert manipulates the data in an effort to support his opinion; (5) whether 
the expert avoids discussing alternatives that conflict with his opinion; and (6) whether the expert formulates his 
16
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the trial judges in their quests for relevancy and reliability, the Court identified four non-exclusive 
factors65 to aid in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence:66 (1) whether the theory or 
                                                                                                                                                         
opinion to coincide with the desired result.  Id. 
64  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-92. 
65  Id. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist 
or test.”).  In addition to the factors the Court laid out in Daubert, the Court also cited other sources that could 
provide additional factors.  See Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 
IOWA L. REV. 879, 911-12 (1982).  In his article, McCormick identified eleven factors: 
 
(1) the potential error rate in using the technique; (2) the existence and maintenance of standards 
governing its use; (3) presence of safeguards in the characteristics of the technique; (4) analogy to 
other scientific techniques whose results are admissible; (5) the extent to which the technique has 
been accepted by scientists in the field involved; (6) the nature and breadth of the inference 
adduced; (7) the clarity and simplicity with which the technique can be described and its results 
explained; (8) the extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and the jury; (9) the 
availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (10) the probative significance of 
the evidence in the circumstances of the case; and (11) the care with which the technique was 
employed in the case.   
 Id.  For additional factors, see for example, Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(stating as a factor whether expert “is being as careful as he would be in his regular professional work outside his 
paid litigation consulting”), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1104 (1997);  Braun v. Lorilland, Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(asking if expert “adhered to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their professional work”);  
Claar v. Burlington N. RR .Co., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (excluding evidence where expert failed to consider other 
obvious cause for plaintiff’s condition). 
66 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.  Just as the federal courts were determining the factors necessary to 
determine the admissibility of expert testimony, the state courts were also devising various admissibility factors.  See 
Elizabeth D. Whitaker & Amy K. Hunt, Civil Evidence, 52 SMU L. REV. 799, 800 (1999).   
The Texas Supreme Court followed Daubert’s footsteps and devised its own non-exclusive list of reliability 
factors: 
 
(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; (2) the extent to which the technique relies 
upon the subjective interpretation of the expert; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review or 
publication; (4) the technique’s potential rate of error; (5) whether the underlying theory or technique has 
been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and (6) the non-judicial uses which 
have been made of the theory or technique.   
 
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc., v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995). 
Oregon also employs its own set of factors to assist the trial judge ascertain whether the evidence is reliable: 
(1) the technique’s general acceptance in the field; (2) the expert’s qualifications and stature; (3) the use 
which has been made of the technique; (4) the potential rate of error; (5) the existence of specialized 
literature; (6) the novelty of the invention; and (7) the extent to which the technique relies on the subjective 
interpretation of the expert.   
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scientific technique has been tested;67 (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review or 
publication;68 (3) the known or potential rate of error;69 and (4) whether the principle was generally 
accepted in the relevant scientific community.70 
                                                                                                                                                         
State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 759 (Or. 1984). 
67  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.  To determine whether a certain technique or theory of scientific knowledge will 
help the trier of fact, it must be capable of being tested and it must have, in fact, been tested.  C. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY 
OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966) (claiming that “the statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of 
empirical test.”);   POPPER, supra  note 8, at 37 (noting that “the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its 
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability”).  See also  Lynn R. Johnson et al., Expert Testimony in Federal Courts: 
Frye, Daubert , and Joiner, 33 A.L.I-A.B.A. 177, 183 (1998).  However, the Daubert decision is not as rigid.  Id.  It 
requires that the theory or technique be capable of being tested, not that it necessarily has been tested.  Id. 
68  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.  This is a pertinent consideration to determine the admissibility of a scientific 
theory or technique.  See Johnson, supra  note 67, at 183.  The publicized theory or technique will be scrutinized by 
various scientific gurus.  Id.  This heightens the likelihood that a particular theory or technique is “good science,” 
absent of any flaws.  Id.  But see Brief of Amici Curiae Daryl E. Chubin et al. at 6, Daubert (No. 92-102) (stating that 
“the fact that ideas and information have not been published in a peer review journal does not mean that they are not 
‘generally accepted,’ or that they are ‘generally rejected,’ or that they cannot represent ‘good science’ ”). 
69  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.  This prong concerns the statistics generated by scientific evidence.  See 
Johnson, supra  note 67, at 183.  Illustrative of this point is the case in which two experts agree on the proper study to 
discern whether a certain drug causes a particular disease.  See REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER at 92-3 (1994). However, the experts disagree on the significance of the statistics produced 
by the study and hence, on the effect of their admissibility, what the jury should be told about the statistics, and how 
the study should be discounted by error rates.  Id. 
70  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).  General acceptance heightens the 
reliability of scientific theories or techniques, in that, numerous individuals in the scientific community have 
scrutinized them and have agreed that they are acceptable.  See Johnson, supra  note 67, at 184.  Moreover, if a theory 
or technique has only attracted minimal support, it can be viewed with skepticism.  Id.  See also  United States v. 
Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that if scientific evidence is admissible under the Frye test it will almost 
always be admissible under the Daubert test; however, the converse is not always true). 
The courts have generally held that the relevant scientific community consists of those individuals or 
professional organizations that have the expertise in the particular field of science at issue.  See United States v. 
Buck, Nos. 84 Cr. 220-CSH, SSS 82 Cr. 312-CSH, 1987 US Dist. LEXIS 9913, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1987) (permitting 
the expert testimony based on handwriting comparison because a large professional community of “forensic 
document examiners” existed and the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners issued certificates of 
qualification in the field);  United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d. 954, 962 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that the gas 
chromatograph analysis was generally accepted in the scientific community because a non-profit organization, 
comprised of academicians and others, promulgated the standards for the analysis);  Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 
855 F.2d. 1188, 1209 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that clinical ecological tests were imp roperly admitted because the two 
leading professional societies in the speciality of allergy and immunology rejected the clinical ecological testing and 
few other professional organizations had endorsed the methodology or results);  United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 
166 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (stating that the presence of expert testimony from not only within the scientific community of 
18
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Although Daubert provided trial judges with a tool to aid in the determination of reliable and 
relevant scientific evidence, it left several questions unanswered:71 (1) whether the Daubert factors 
apply to all expert evidence or only to scientific evidence;72 (2) whether the decision to apply the 
Daubert factors is required or suggested;73 and (3) whether the decision to apply the factors is 
                                                                                                                                                         
scientists who created a particular technique, but also those outside that community is crucial to a finding of general 
acceptance within a community);  Head v. Lithonia Corp., 881 F.2d. 941, 944 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that expert 
testimony on “topographical brain mapping” was not admissible because this technique was not accepted by other 
experts in the field of neurology or by the American Academy of Neurology). 
71  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist voiced his concerns with the enforcement of the Daubert decision, in that, the majority failed to determine 
if their decision also applied to “technical of other specialized knowledge.”  Id.  Moreover, the Chief Justice’s 
exclamation that “countless more questions will surely arise” when district judges try to apply the Daubert holding, 
not only criticized the majority’s decision, but foreshadowed the controversy that would soon erupt.  Id.  See also  
David O. Stewart, A New Test: Decision Creates Uncertain Future for Admissibility of Expert Testimony, A.B.A. J. 
48, 48 (Nov. 1993) (“[T]he catch . . . is that no one is exactly sure what the new standard is.”);  Timothy B. Dyk and 
Gregory A. Castanias, Daubert  Doesn’t End Debate on Experts, NAT’L L.J. 17, 17 (Aug. 2, 1993) (“the opinion of the 
court, in rejecting the existing standard, has created considerable confusion”); M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE Sec. 702.5 (3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996).  Professor Graham states:  
In attempting to understand the application of Daubert by the trial and appellate courts since 1993 . 
. . one can easily become confused and frustrated.  Daubert is a very, very incomplete case if not a 
very, very bad decision.  It has resulted in a series of conflicting and confusing if not conflicted 
and confused opinions. 
  
Id.  See JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 10-51 (1999) 
(outlining the questions that remained unanswered after Daubert). 
72  Footnote eight in the Daubert opinion led to this question.  See infra  note 98 and accompanying text. 
73  Several circuits have held that Daubert may apply to non-scientific evidence, however these circuits 
believe that the four Daubert factors are limited to scientific evidence.  See Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 
Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 479 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert factors only apply to scientific testimony); McCullock v. 
H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that engineer’s testimony was based on “specialized” rather 
than “scientific” knowledge and was supported by his “extensive practical experience”);  Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. 
S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 784 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the trial court did not use Daubert factors to evaluate experts’ 
testimony);  Carroll v. Morgan, 17 F.3d 782, 789-90 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming admission of expert testimony based on 
thirty years of experience);  United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing that Daubert 
factors are limited to scientific evidence);  McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d. 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(stating that the district court erred “in applying the Daubert factors, which are relevant only to testimony bearing on 
‘scientific knowledge’”).  But see Peitzmeier v. Hennessey Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293 (8th Cir. 1996) (examining the 
testimony under each of the Daubert factors);  Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996) (declaring 
that the trial court erred in not applying the Daubert factors to social science expert). 
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subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard or to a de novo review.74 The ambiguous nature of the 
Daubert decision required federal courts to wrestle with the probable answers to these questions 
when they found themselves faced with non-scientific expert evidence.75 
                                                 
74 Although the Daubert decision generated some ambiguity, it did provide a general framework which 
courts can utilize when examining scientific evidence.  See Kent, supra note 63, at 529.  After the Daubert decision, 
the trial court’s role in determining the validity of scientific evidence is strengthened.  Id.  See also  Zuchowicz v. 
United States, 140 F.3d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing trial court’s strengthened role).  Moreover, the trial courts 
do not have to rely on the scientific community to make admissibility determinations, but can sort out expert opinion 
that is not based on scientific theories.  See Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F.Supp. 756, 774 (E.D. Va. 1995).  Second, the 
trial court has the responsibility to ensure that every stage of the expert’s decision-making process is reliable.  See 
Kent, supra  note 63, at 529.  This involves considering both the steps of the underlying methodology and the 
conclusions drawn from the methodology.  Id.  Therefore, if a step in the methodology is flawed, it does not satisfy 
the admissibility standard in Rule 702.  See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F.Supp. 1387, 1401 (D. Or. 1996) 
(stating that when court performs its “gatekeeping” role it must ensure faithful application of scientific methodology 
“from initial premise to ultimate conclusion” and not admit evidence based only on “leap of faith”).  Next, the trial 
court must examine the fit requirement of both the scientific techniques and the conclusions drawn from those 
techniques.  See Kent, supra  note 63, at 530.  In this examination, the reliability and relevancy analyses mesh.  Id.  If 
the court determines that the underlying methodology or conclusions are not reliable, then the expert’s testimony 
does not satisfy the “fit” requirement.  Id.  Lastly, the trial court must also apply other provisions of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.  Id.  Specifically, the trial court must also use rules 104(a), 403, and 703.  Rule 104(a) provides that 
“preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness . . . or the admissibility of evidence 
shall be determined by the court . . . .”  FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  Rule 403 allows the court to exclude relevant and reliable 
scientific testimony “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”  FED. R. EVID. 403.  Finally, Rule 703 complements Rule 702 by requiring the trial court to “make 
an independent evaluation of the reliability of the data” underlying the expert opinion.  In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB 
Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 747 (3d Cir. 1994). 
75  As a result of the distinction between scientific and non-scientific evidence created by the Daubert 
Court, inconsistent and controversial applications developed.  See K. Issac de Vyver, Comment, Opening the Door 
but Keeping the Lights Off: Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and the Applicability of the Daubert Test to Nonscientific 
Evidence, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177, 186-89 (1999);  Hrabosky, supra  note 8, at 206-16;  Laser, supra note 9, at 
1394-1402. 
The first approach, which was utilized by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, was to apply Daubert’s four-part test 
to all expert evidence.  See Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding that 
clinical physician’s expert testimony, though not “hard science,” was still subject to the Daubert test);  Berry v. City 
of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1352 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that a non-scientific expert on “police policies and practices” was 
subject to Daubert’s four-part test). 
The second approach rests more on a reliability analysis rather than a strict adherence to the four-part test.  
The courts focus on the factors pertinent to the particular area in question.  See In Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat’l 
Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that banker’s testimony was admissible under Daubert and 
Rule 702 because during his forty-year banking career, the banker became very familiar with the commercial 
agreements in question and had observed firsthand the well-established industry custom and practice);  United 
States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that the “Daubert tests are helpful to assist the court 
in its consideration of the expertise in question”). 
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D. General Electric Co. v. Joiner  
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the United States Supreme Court continued to work on 
devising the proper standards to apply to the area of expert evidence.76  In this second of three 
influential cases, the Joiner Court resolved one of the questions left unanswered by Daubert:77 the 
                                                                                                                                                         
The third approach used by some circuits is an inconsistent application of Daubert to non-scientific 
evidence.  Compare Roback v. V.I.P. Transp., Inc., 90 F.3d 1207, 1216 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting lower courts literal 
approach to Daubert and instead focused on the fact that the expert’s data was subject to verification), with Frymire-
Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing the importance of always analyzing the 
validity of the witness’s reasoning as required by Daubert). 
Lastly, some circuits held that Daubert was inapplicable to non-scientific expert witnesses.  See Iacobelli 
Construction, Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994) (articulating that “Daubert sought to clarify the 
standard for evaluating ‘scientific knowledge’ for purposes of admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 702."); 
Thomas v. Newton Int’l Entertainment, 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “Daubert was clearly 
confined to the evaluation of scientific expert testimony”);  United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(reaffirming Thomas the court stated “courts evaluating the admissibility of ‘technical’ or ‘specialized’ knowledge . . . 
must conduct a more traditional Rule 702 analysis. . . .”). 
76 General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).  Mr. Joiner was an electrician, who repaired electrical 
transformers for the city of Thomasville, Georgia.  Id. at 139.  The city later discovered that polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs) were contaminating some of its transformers.  Id.  Later, Joiner was diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer.  Id.  
Joiner’s theory was that, although he had a history of cigarette smoking and a family history of lung cancer, the 
exposure to the PCBs and their derivatives – polychlorinated dibenzofurans (“furans”) and polychlorinated 
dibenzodioxins (“dioxins”) – promoted his lung cancer.  Id. at 140.  Joiner relied on two experts  to promote his theory 
and to oppose General Electric’s summary judgment motion.  Id.  The District Court determined that the two experts 
failed to show a causal link between the exposure to the PCBs and the small-cell lung cancer.  Id.  The Court of 
Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that “because the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert 
testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a particularly stringent standard of review to the trial 
judge’s exclusion of expert testimony.”  Id.  Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that abuse of 
discretion is the proper standard of review.  Id. at 146.  
77  See Real, supra note 62, at 221 (articulating that the circuit courts were not uniform in their application of 
the standard of review; ranging from a “hard look” in the Third Circuit to “manifest error” in the Fifth Circuit). See 
also Ed Peters Jewelry Co.  v. C & J Jewelry Co., Inc., 124 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1997) (declaring that standard of 
review applicable to Rule 702 is manifest trial court error);  Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(reviewing district court’s evidentiary rulings for “manifest error”);  United States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1163 
(2d Cir. 1993) (articulating that “manifest error” is the correct standard of review when examining the admission of 
expert testimony);  In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 733 (concluding that the review requires a “hard look” to determine if 
district court superseded its discretion); United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir. 1988) (“The standard 
of review for evidentiary ruling is the narrow abuse of discretion standard.”);  Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 
1378, 1383 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion);  Hart v. O’Brien, 
127 F.3d 424, 437 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1103 (1999) (stating that evidentiary rulings are reviewed for 
“manifest error”);  Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P., Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1485 (5th Cir. 1997) (declaring that deference is given 
to a district court’s determination of the credibility of witnesses and will not be overturned unless there is “manifest 
error”);  Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1371 (6th Cir. 1992) (“A district court’s evidentiary determinations are 
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correct standard of review78 applicable to a district court’s evidentiary rulings.79  Reaffirming its prior 
holdings relating to the standard of review in evidentiary rulings,80 the Court stated that the proper 
standard of review pertaining to a district court’s evidentiary rulings was the abuse-of-discretion81 
                                                                                                                                                         
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.”);  United States v. Allison, 120 F.3d 71, 74 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(reviewing evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion);  Buckner v. Sam’s Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290, 292-93 (7th Cir. 
1996) (holding that trial courts decision to exclude evidence under Daubert should be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion);  Porchia v. Design Equip. Co., 113 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating the proper standard of review for 
evidentiary decisions is abuse of discretion);  Paramount Farms, Inc v. Hai Jyi Foods Co., 121 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(declaring that evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion);  Pandit v. American Honda Motor Co., 82 
F.3d 376, 379 (10th Cir. 1996) (“We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”);  Evans v. Mathis Funeral 
Home, Inc., 996 F.2d 266, 268 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The district court has broad discretion in determining whether to admit 
or exclude expert testimony, and its decision will be disturbed on appeal only if it is manifestly erroneous.”);  United 
States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion). 
78  The Supreme Court stated that “[f]or purposes of standard of review, decisions by judges are 
traditionally divided into three categories: denominated questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact 
(reviewable for clear error), and matters of discretion (reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion’).”  Pierce v. Underwood, 
487 U.S. 552, 558 (1998).  See also  Cynthia K. Y. Lee, A New “Sliding Scale of Deference” Approach to Abuse of 
Discretion: Appellate Review of District Court Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1997) (asserting that lower courts often utilize a categorical approach in determining which standard 
of review to use).   
79  Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 (“We hold . . . that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by which to review a 
district court’s decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence.”).  It should be noted that utilizing the abuse of 
discretion standard of review may result in appellate court’s allowance of trial courts to reach different conclusions 
regarding the admissibility of specific scientific evidence.  See Official U.S. Supreme Court Transcripts at 6, Joiner, 
(No. 96-188).  Chief Justice Rehnquist received an affirmative reply to his question:  “[w]hen . . . you say abuse of 
discretion, as opposed to perhaps de novo review, . . . I take it that means that a . . . properly acting district court 
might have reached different . . . conclusions on the same evidence, and both would be affirmed on appeal?”  Id. 
80  See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997) (“The standard of review applicable to the 
evidentiary rulings of the district court is abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984).  
Additionally, this issue has been around for some time.  See Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1878).  In this case, 
the Court stated that “cases arise where it is very much a matter of discretion with the court whether to receive or 
exclude evidence; but the appellate court will not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous.”  
Id. 
81  When an appellate court is reviewing a case, its role is not to determine whether the trial court’s decision 
was correct, but rather to determine whether the trial court’s decision was unreasonable or otherwise abusive.  See 
Western Elec. Co., Inc. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 430-31 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
“Abuse of discretion” occurs when the “appellate court is of the opinion that” the trial judge has made a 
“clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment - one is that clearly against logic and effect of such facts as are 
presented in support of the application or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts 
disclosed upon the hearing . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5-6 (6th ed. 1991).  But see Lee, supra  note 78, at 21.  Lee 
states that “the Supreme Court has never provided a clear definition of abuse of discretion review.  At times, the 
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standard.82  
Additionally, the Court addressed Joiner’s argument that Daubert focused solely on 
principles and methodology, not on generated conclusions83 and therefore, the Court of Appeals 
reversal was correct.84  The Court concluded that conclusions and methodology “are not entirely 
distinct from one another”85 and hence, did not confine the abuse-of-discretion review solely to the 
methodologies of the expert, but also included the expert’s conclusions under this umbrella of 
review.86 
E. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael 
The definitive moment in the area of evidence occurred with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                                                                         
Court seems to equate abuse of discretion with the highly deferential clearly erroneous review.  At other times, the 
Court has hinted at a less deferential definition of abuse of discretion.”  Id.  See also  Anderson v. City of Bessemer 
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (declaring that the clearly erroneous review “standard . . . does not entitle a reviewing 
court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case 
differently”).  Additionally, some courts have even equated the clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion standards.  
See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 n.3 (1996) (stating that the clearly erroneous standard is equivalent to 
the abuse of discretion standard). 
82  Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.  But see Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority 
Between Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/ Jury Question, and 
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1042 (1986).  The Supreme Court has stated that not all evidentiary 
decisions are subject to a trial judge’s discretion.  Id.  One example illustrative of this occurrence is when the issue is 
categorized as legal and hence, subject to a stricter standard of review.  Id.  The Court has deemed “whether evidence 
is protected by the work product and attorney-client privileges” and “whether evidence is hearsay or qualifies under 
an exception to the hearsay rules” as legal issues and subject to a heightened review.  Id. at 1042 n.361.  See also 
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981);  Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). 
83  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). 
84  Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. 
85  Id. 
86  Id.    See also  Robert P. Redemann, General Electric v. Joiner and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael: The Ipse 
Dixit Twins, 28 SUM BRIEF 54, 55 (1999) (arguing that because conclusions and methodologies are not “entirely 
distinct” it provides trial judges with wide latitude to exclude expert opinions that do not reach their “comfort level”). 
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Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael.87  In this case, the Court finally put to rest the contradictory 
applications of Daubert within the federal court system88 by extending the trial judge’s “gatekeeping” 
function to include non-scientific expert evidence.89  The Court stated that a trial judge may apply the 
Daubert factors to non-scientific evidence to aid in its determination.90  While the Court did note that 
                                                 
87  Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  Carmichael brought suit against the tire maker 
and distributor (collectively known as “Kumho Tire”) when the rear passenger tire of a minivan blew out and resulted 
in a fatal accident.  Id. at 142.  The plaintiffs called Carlson, an engineer and consultant, as their expert to testify as to 
the cause of the tire’s blow out.  Id.  The defendant motioned to exclude this testimony because it failed to satisfy the 
reliability requirement of Rule 702 stated in Daubert.  Id. at 145.  The district court granted defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment.  Id.   When the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case, it concluded that Daubert was explicitly 
limited to scientific testimony.  Id. at 146.  As such, the appellate court stated that the district court erred in applying 
the Daubert decision to Carlson’s testimony.  Id.  Defendants then filed a writ of certiorari, which was granted by the 
United States Supreme Court.  Id.  The Supreme Court determined that Daubert’s “gatekeeping” function extends to 
all types of expert testimony.  Id. at 147-48. 
88  See supra  note 76 and accompanying text. 
89  The Court extended the Daubert “gatekeeping” function to non-scientific testimony for three reasons: (1) 
Rule 702 does not make a “relative distinction” between scientific and non-scientific knowledge and therefore, Rule 
702 requires that all expert testimony must be reliable; (2) the rationale behind Daubert’s gatekeeping function was 
that Rules 702 and 703 “grant expert witnesses testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the ‘assumption 
that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline’ ” and that this 
rationale supports the requirement that all expert testimony be reliable; and (3) drawing a distinction between 
scientific and non-scientific experts would be a very difficult and unnecessary task.  Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-49.  See 
generally Hrabosky, supra  note 8, at 219 (outlining the reasons for the court’s decision in Kumho). 
On the other hand, there are those who believe that the Kumho decision will lead to numerous problems.  
See de Vyver, supra  note 75, at 197-99.  One of the problems created by Kumho was its failure to identify a standard 
to determine the reliability of non-scientific evidence.  Id.  Analogous to the courts’ fears of admitting “junk” 
scientific evidence, the fear of “junk” non-scientific evidence will now surface.  Id.  This fear may be greater because 
scientific evidence is more readily verifiable than non-scientific evidence which cannot generally be duplicated.  Id.  
Without any parameters, trial judges will make decisions that may result in the admission of unreliable evidence and 
exclusion of reliable evidence.  Id.  A second problem results from the broad discretion given to trial judges.  Id.  This 
discretion may result in trial judges misusing or abusing their power.  Id.  Their will be no uniformity in the judges’ 
evaluations, that is, some judges may use all the Daubert factors, some may use some, while others may not use any. 
 Id.  The broad discretion that trial judges were given by Kumho, in an area that judges know little about, has the 
potential for creating additional problems in regards to expert testimony.  Id.     
90  Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149-50.  But see Hrabosky, supra  note 8, at 226.  Despite the fact that the Court has 
extended the Daubert factors to non-scientific evidence, there still is no objective basis for determining the reliability 
of non-scientific evidence.  Id.  This is because of the lack of general objective criteria that could apply to all non-
scientific evidence.  Id.  It may be possible to generate specific reliability criteria for each area of expertise; however, 
this would be an impractical and costly system to implement.  Id. at 225.  Not only does the Kumho decision fail to 
clarify the reliability standards for non-scientific evidence, but it may have also decreased the effectiveness of 
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the application of the Daubert factors was not a requisite formality for admitting or excluding 
evidence, it did state that the trial judge could consider any applicable factors when evaluating the 
evidence.91  In other words, the Daubert factors are not a definitive checklist or test to determine 
admissibility, but rather factors that can be used if necessary.92   
Although the Court provided trial judges with broad boundaries to determine an expert’s 
reliability,93 the Court emphasized that this determination must be faithfully fulfilled by “making certain 
that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs 
in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the 
relevant field.”94  Lastly, the Supreme Court ensured that trial judges would have these broad 
boundaries by reiterating that the abuse-of-discretion standard was the proper standard to review a 
                                                                                                                                                         
screening out unreliable scientific expert testimony.  Id. at 226.  After Kumho’s pronouncement that the four factors 
could be used “when applicable,” trial courts may use this permissive language as a mechanism to avoid their 
“gatekeeping” function when evaluating scientific expert testimony.  Id.   
91  Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149-52.  The Court stated:  “We can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for 
all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets of cases categorized 
by category of expert or by kind of evidence.”  Id. at 150. 
92  Id.  The Court stated that the trial courts should apply the Daubert factors “where they are reasonable 
measures of the reliability of expert testimony.”  Id. 
There are additional considerations the court must evaluate that extend beyond the holdings in Daubert and 
Kumho.  See Patricia A. Krebs and Bryan J. De Tray, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael: A Flexible Approach to 
Analyzing Expert Testimony Under Daubert, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 989, 995 (1999).  One consideration that the court 
must examine is the expert’s qualifications in the particular field of expertise.  Id.  An expert’s lack of expertise does 
not necessarily prevent the expert from testifying, but it may impact the court’s reliability analysis.  Id.  The court 
must also consider the analytical gap between the underlying facts and the expert’s conclusions.  Id.  This enables 
the court to exclude evidence that is “connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”  General Elec. 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).  Another consideration the court can evaluate is the necessity of the expert to 
assist the trier of fact.  Id.  If the expert offers nothing to the trial, his or her testimony will be excluded.  Id. 
93  See supra  notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
94  Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.  
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trial court’s admission or exclusion of expert testimony.95 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Why the Court Needed to Decide Kumho 
Although Daubert specifically stated that trial judges have the ability to determine the 
admissibility of scientific evidence, it left these same judges in a conundrum in regards to non-
scientific evidence.96  This situation emerged as a result of the infamous footnote eight in the Daubert 
decision, where the Court limited its decision to the scientific field.97  
                                                 
95  Id.  Justice Scalia, however, in his concurring opinion cautioned trial judges that while “the Daubert 
factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and 
hence an abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 158-59.  Moreover, Justice Scalia emphasized that the discretion Kumho Tire 
gives “is not discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function.”  Id. 
96  As one commentator noted:  
 
You can go across the range of cases; accountants, engineers and other experts routinely testify in 
products liability cases.  With all of these kinds of experts, it’s debatable whether what they do is pure 
science in the sense of, for example, epidemiologists.  That’s why the federal courts are a little confused as 
to how to assess reliability.   
 
See Marcia Coyle, Beyond “Daubert” - Court Hears “Kumho”, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 14, 1998, at  A1 Col. 2 (quoting Mr. 
Alan E. Untereiner). 
97  “Our discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered 
here.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.8 (1993).  It should be noted that the Court in 
Daubert stated that the only reason that it referred to “scientific” testimony was “because that was the nature of the 
expertise” at issue.  Id.  Moreover, it is only logical to extend its rationale to any type of expert.  See Imwinkelried, 
supra  note 9, at 2281 (“If the mention of scientific knowledge [in Rule 702] suffices to mandate reliability standards 
for scientific testimony, a fortiori the mention of nonscientific expert knowledge should compel the courts to seek to 
formulate reliability standards for that type of expert evidence as well.”);  David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth 
of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 555, 559 (1995) (restricting Daubert to science “displays a crabbed 
interpretation of the Court’s opinion as well as a misconstruction of the principles underlying Rule 702");  Stephen D. 
Easton, “Yer Outta Here!” A Framework for Analyzing the Potential Exclusion of Expert Testimony Under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 32 U. RICH. L . REV. 1, 25 (1998) (“Although Daubert makes specific reference to science, 
its reasoning is not applicable only to scientific expert testimony.”);  Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific 
Evidence in a Post-Daubert  World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2035-36 (1996) (“Daubert’s overarching emphasis on scientific 
validity as an admissibility requirement is its greatest contribution . . . . [It] represents a first step . . . . In the future, 
separate validation factors and standards for inquiry should be developed for different disciplines.”);  G. Michael 
Fenner, The Daubert  Handbook: The Case, its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 948 
(1996) (“[t]he general point . . . that when expert testimony is proffered and resisted, the trial court should hold a 
26
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Notwithstanding the fact that the footnote was solely written based on the scientific nature of 
the Daubert case, the courts did not know how to address the applicability of Daubert to the non-
scientific field; therefore, differing opinions evolved.98  The most dramatic divergence in views 
evolved amongst the circuit courts.99  Some circuit courts relied on the explicit language of footnote 
eight and therefore restricted Daubert to scientific evidence.100  Other circuits did not place emphasis 
on the language of footnote eight, and declared that Daubert was applicable to non-scientific 
evidence.101 
B. A Correct Resolution   
The inconsistent approaches asserted by the circuit courts illustrated the need to resolve the 
                                                                                                                                                         
hearing to determine whether the evidence is reliable and relevant- applies to all expert evidence.”). 
98  See supra  note 76; infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
99  Id. 
100  Id.  See also  Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
Daubert is only applicable when expert relies on some scientific principle or methodology); Iacobelli Const., Inc. v. 
County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that Daubert was not applicable to expert opinions that are not 
based on science);  Carmichael v. Samyang Tire Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997) (declaring that Daubert did not 
apply because expert did not base his opinion on scientific theories but on his experience);  United States v. Jones, 
107 F.3d 1147, 1158 (6th Cir. 1997) (announcing that Daubert factors do not apply to handwriting analyst); McKendall 
v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806-08 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that mechanical engineer was not subject to 
Daubert factors, but was qualified as an expert by virtue of engineering experience and investigation of hundreds of 
forklift accidents) . 
101  See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  See also  Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 
1997) (stating that Daubert is not restricted to novel controversial methods or techniques);  Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 
93 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the argument that Daubert applies only to novel scientific evidence). 
District courts have also applied Daubert to areas outside the scientific realm.  See Lithuanian Commerce 
Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 177 F.R.D. 245 (D. N.J. 1997) (applying Daubert to disciplines outside the hard science 
fields; specifically, it was applied to an accountant);  Hulmes v. Honda Motor Co., 960 F. Supp. 844, 865 (D. N.J. 1997) 
(holding that Daubert concerns “whether novel or untested methodologies are sufficiently reliable that conclusions 
based on them can be of some use to the jury”). 
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controversy surrounding the applicability of the Daubert decision to non-scientific evidence.102  
Judges, attorneys, and experts all acknowledged the importance of this decision and the impact that it 
would have on the admissibility of non-scientific evidence.103  Therefore, the Kumho decision was 
highly anticipated by many individuals.  Despite this anticipation, the decision was not surprising;104 
however, it was the correct resolution.105 
1. The Language of Rule 702 Does Not Restrict the “Gatekeeping” Function to “Scientific” 
Knowledge 
 
                                                 
102  See supra  notes 76, 101-102 and accompanying text. 
103  “As one can see from some of the people who have filed amicus briefs, this is a case on which 
potentially a lot of money could ride, in terms of controlling litigation . . . . I’m not sure I see it as a very vital 
intellectual question, but it is certainly something that pragmatically could have enormous effect.”  See Coyle, supra 
note 96, at AI Col.2. (quoting evidence scholar Margaret A. Berger).  
104  See Mark A. Hofmann, High Court to Revisit Old Issues, BUSINESS INSURANCE,  Sept. 28, 1998, at 2 
(quoting David G. Leitch) (“The high court ‘will probably be reluctant’ to draw distinctions about the standards 
governing different types of expert testimony.”).  But see William H. Latham, The “Gatekeepers” Discretion: 
Flexible Standards on Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Wake of Kumho, 11 S.C. LAW. 15, 15 (1999) (stating that 
what was a surprise to many was the Court’s assertion that the Daubert factors were not mandatory considerations, 
but merely suggestions). 
105  See infra  Parts III.B.1-4. 
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Examining Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence clearly illustrates that it applies, without 
qualification or exception, to all expert testimony.106  The language of the rule does not distinguish 
between “scientific” knowledge, “technical” knowledge, or “other specialized” knowledge.107  
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court consistently interprets the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
as with other statutory provisions, according to their plain meaning.108  Therefore, the interpretation 
                                                 
106  The Supreme Court has not characterized its decision in Daubert as limited to “scientific” experts.  See 
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 310 n.7 (1998), 1266 n.7 (1998) (“In Daubert, . . . we held . . . that expert 
testimony could be admitted if the district court deemed it both relevant and reliable.”). The courts of appeals have 
also read Daubert to be applicable to all types of exp erts.  See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir. 
1994) (recognizing that Daubert’s “language relative to the ‘gatekeeper’ function of federal judges is applicable to all 
expert testimony offered under Rule 702").  See also  Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990-92 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the application of Daubert in determining admissibility of expert testimony is not limited to “scientific” 
knowledge). 
This interpretation is not limited to courts, as evidenced by commentators reaching the same conclusion.  
See MARC S. KLEIN AND PATRICK W. LEE,  EXPERT EVIDENCE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE FJC 
MANUAL 47 & n.159 (Black & Lee eds., 1997). 
107  See Petitioner’s Brief at 38, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1998) (No. 97-1709).  See also  
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993).  Using the terms “scientific,” “technical,” and 
“other specialized” to modify “knowledge” is nothing more than “general descriptive language covering the sort of 
expert testimony which courts have customarily received.”  Id.  It should not be interpreted as an expectation that the 
experts be “broken down into numerous subspecies of expertise.” Id.;  C. WRIGHT & V. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE  § 6266, at 285 (1997) (“[N]othing in the language of the Rule suggests that scientific expert testimony 
should be treated differently from other expert testimony”). 
The word “scientific” refers to “a grounding in the methods and procedures of science.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. 
at 590.  The word “technical” can be defined as “practical knowledge especially of a mechanical or scientific subject” 
which can encompass “knowledge that is characterized by specialization.”  WEBSTE.R’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2348 (1986).  “Specialized” knowledge encompasses “any knowledge focused on a particular area of 
study, profession or experience,” and many argue that it is broader than “scientific” and “technical” knowledge.  See 
Linda Sandstrom Simard and William G. Yo ung, Daubert’s  Gatekeeper: The Role of the District Judge in Admitting 
Expert Testimony, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1457, 1466 (1994). 
Additionally, various courts have used the terms “scientific,” “technical,” and “specialized” 
interchangeably.  See Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 553 (1959) (“[P]rovisions in railroad collective 
bargaining agreement are of a specialized technical nature calling for specialized technical knowledge in ascertaining 
their meaning and application.”); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 117 (1977) (referring both to 
scientific knowledge and technical information as factors necessary to restore and maintain water quality);  Federal 
Power Comm’n v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 501 (1955) (claiming that public utility rate making 
requires technical knowledge of accounting, economics, and policy);  Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 
363 U.S. 263, 268 (1960) (referring to the specialized knowledge of the regulation of natural gas businesses). 
108 See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J. concurring)) (“[T]he starting point in every case involving construction of 
29
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of Rule 702 should not differ.109  Utilizing the plain meaning of the rule would authorize expert 
witnesses to testify based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.110   
Additionally, by focusing on the word “scientific” in Rule 702 to determine the applicability of 
the “gatekeeping” function would misapply the Daubert opinion.111  The Court in Daubert stated 
that the “gatekeeping” function was derived from the word “knowledge,” not the words that modify 
it.112  Upon an examination of Rule 702, “scientific” is not the only word that modifies 
“knowledge.”113    Therefore, the proper application of the “gatekeeping” function encompasses 
scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge.114  
                                                                                                                                                         
a statute is the language itself.”). 
109  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 (“We interpret the legislatively-enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would 
any statute.”). 
110  Both “scientific”or “technical” are built around the word “knowledge,” which implies the expert’s 
opinion involves some sort of “scientific” or “technical” knowledge.  See Hanks v. Korea Iron & Steel Co., 993 F. 
Supp. 1204, 1207 (S.D. Ill. 1998).  The term “knowledge” is “more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation,” 
it is “any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted truths on good grounds.” 
 Lithuanian Commerce Corp., Ltd. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 177 F.R.D. 245, 255 (D.N.J. 1997). 
111  See supra  notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
112  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90. 
113  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
114 According to the American College of Trial Lawyers Federal Rules of Evidence Committee: 
 
We urge that it is preferable that there be a single conceptual framework for evaluating the 
admissibility of all types of expert evidence.  Although it may be attractive to academics and 
ubiquitous CLE speakers to construct a complex ‘Daubertology’ discipline in which fine 
distinctions are drawn among types of expert testimony, that result would be harmful both to the 
doing of justice and to our system of advocacy . . . .  Given the combination of the enormously 
crowded dockets of the federal district courts and the apparent need for those courts to hold 
‘Daubert hearings’ with respect to challenged expert testimony, it is highly desirable that trial 
judges have a single standard to apply . . . . 
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Lastly, the legislative history of the Federal Rules of Evidence supports a broad application 
of Rule 702 to all types of experts.115  Following the “liberal thrust of the Federal Rules,” the expert 
testimony provision of Rule 702 follows a “general approach to relaxing the traditional barriers to 
‘opinion’ testimony.”116  The legislature’s explication of the rules illustrates that restricting Rule 702 to 
scientific expert testimony would be counterintuitive.117 
2. Incentives to Couch Testimony 
Limiting the application of Daubert to testimony which is based on either scientific principles 
or particular methodologies may cause another problem: experts will attempt to deliver their expert 
                                                                                                                                                         
David J. Beck et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Committee, American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards and 
Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Evidence After Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 577 (1994).  See also  
Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1527 (1995) (“The least confusing 
and arbitrary way to deal with the classification issue would be to apply the same general standards of reliability and 
relevance to all types of expert testimony.”). 
115 FED. R. EVID. 702, Advisory Committee’s Notes (observing that rule is “broadly phrased” to expand the 
admissibility of expert testimony).  See also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 165 n.9 (1988) (stating that a 
key canon to the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is that “Congress did not amend the Advisory 
Committee’s draft in any way that touches on the question before us, the Committee’s commentary is particularly 
relevant in determining the meaning of the document Congress enacted.”). 
116  Beech Aircraft , 488 U.S. at 169.  See also  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89 (stating that these changes were 
hardly accidental);  Hon. George C. Pratt, A Judicial Perspective on Opinion Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 39 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, 314  n.5 (1982) (“[T]he rules reflect an enlightened, academic view of opinion testimony that 
dates back some fifty years.”). 
117  “The Rule provides that expert testimony of all types -- not only the scientific testimony specifically 
addressed in Daubert -- presents questions of admissibility for the trial courts in deciding whether the evidence is 
reliable and helpful, and as such is governed by Rule 104(a).”  FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee’s Note, 
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rules of Evidence 702.   
It is evident that the drafters of Rule 702 did not intend different treatment for “scientific,” “technical,” or 
“specialized” knowledge because where the drafters explicitly wanted categories or qualifications they were 
specified.  Compare FED. R. EVID. 701 (referring to lay opinion testimony), with Federal Rules of Evidence 702 
(referring to expert testimony).  See also  FED. R. EVID. 403 (outlining twenty-four separate hearsay exceptions, each in 
its own discrete subsection);  Jonathan R. Schofield, A Misapplication of Daubert: Compton v. Subaru of America 
Opens the Gate for Unreliable and Irrelevant Expert Testimony, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 489, 506 (1997) (“If the drafters 
intended that different standards should apply to various types of experts under Rule 702 or that there should be 
exception for certain kinds of expert evidence, arguably, they would have incorporated them into the Rules.”). 
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testimony under the guise of experience,118 rather than scientific techniques or methodologies, to 
escape the court’s scrutiny.119  With this crafty facade, it delimits the purpose of Daubert, which is to 
ensure the admission of relevant and reliable evidence.120  By couching an expert’s testimony in a 
non-scientific principle, the courts will not subject it to a rigorous examination like it would if the 
                                                 
118  The word “experience” is not succinct.  Petitioner’s Brief at 29, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137 (1998) (No. 97-1709).  It can include one’s prior observations or more expansively everything one has 
encountered throughout life.  Id.  Thus, practically any type of expert testimony could be re-cast as exp erienced 
based.  Id. at 30.  The Rules Committee realized that experts may attempt to circumvent Rule 702; therefore, they 
addressed this issue in the proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 701.  Id. (quoting Advisory Committee Notes) (“[T]he 
proposal amendments [to Rule 701] are intended ‘to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 
702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.’ ”).  The proposed 
Rule 701 states:  
 
If the witness is  not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or 
inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which (a) are rationally based on the 
perception of the witness, (b) are helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the 
determination of a fact in issue, and (c) are not based on scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge. 
Id.  
119  See Faigman, supra note 8, at 422.  A prime example of an expert witness couching an opinion occurred 
in United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997).  The Court held that the Daubert analysis did not apply to 
a psychologist who testified on child sexual abuse because her testimony was a result of interviewing many abuse 
victims, not on any scientific knowledge.  Id. at 1330.  This determination is a fallacy.  See Krebs, supra  note 92, at  
996-97.  This fallacy is evinced by the very definition of psychology, which is the “science of mind and behavior.”  
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 943 (10th ed. 1996).   Psychologists perform various scientific 
analyses, analyze behavior, and derive diagnoses.  See Krebs, supra  note 92, at 996-97.  Moreover, there is literature 
and accepted methods utilized in this field.  Id.  A psychologist’s observations are based on science and should not 
avoid scrutiny by a mere exclamation that it is not based on a scientific method.  Id.  But see Jenson v. Eveleth 
Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1297 (8th Cir. 1997) (doubting the applicability of Daubert to “soft sciences” such as 
psychology because “there are social sciences in which the research, theories, and opinions cannot have the 
exactness of hard science methodologies”).   
For a discussion illustrating various approaches to eliminate couching testimony, see Hrabosky, supra note 
8, at 227.  An expert’s attempt to couch opinions will not go unnoticed.  Id.  Through our effective adversarial system, 
the expert’s scheme will be revealed on cross-examination.  Id. at 227-28.  Alternatively, the opposing party could 
impeach the expert by offering its own scientific expert.  Id. at 228.  See also  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579  (“[V]igorous 
cross-examination and presentation of contrary evidence . . . are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking 
shaky but admissible evidence.”). 
120  See Scholfield, supra  note 117, at  515 (“An expert’s testimony that is likely to fail under Daubert’s 
scientific factors could be repackaged under the guise of technical or nonscientific evidence and could avoid the 
application of Daubert.”);  Laser, supra  note 9, at 1409 (“[A]pproach seems to turn Daubert on its head . . . an expert 
can get around the Daubert inquiry by saying that no methodology was used at all, . . . [and] if there is no 
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testimony was introduced as a scientific principle.121   
In addition, judges do not possess the skills necessary to prevent this occurrence.122  Judges 
are “experts” in the legal field and are not sufficiently versed in other fields to circumvent this 
practice.123   Therefore, judges rely heavily on the expert’s testimony as to the foundation of his or 
                                                                                                                                                         
methodology, then the expert’s opinion is necessarily speculative.”). 
121 See Target Mkt. Publ’g Inc. v. Advo, Inc., 136 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that if “an expert 
who was well qualified as an astronomer offered to testify based on lengthy and careful observation that the sun 
revolves around the earth, a court would not be obliged to submit the testimony to the jury”).  See also  Watkins v. 
Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997 ) (“It seems exactly backwards that experts who purport to rely on 
general engineering principles and practical experience might escape screening . . . simply by stating that their 
conclusions were not reached by any particular method or technique.”). 
122  See infra  note 135 and accompanying text. 
123   The purpose for using an expert is that the factfinder does not have knowledge in that area.  See Hand, 
supra note 1, at 54.  As Learned Hand noted: 
 
The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not the facts . . . but general truths derived from his 
specialized experience.  But how can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon an 
experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own?  It is just because they are incompetent for 
such a task that the expert is necessary at all. 
 
 Id. 
Not only does the factfinder lack the skill to appreciate the weakness of an expert’s testimony, but an 
expert’s testimony may “assume a posture of mystic infallibility” if not properly checked by the judge.  See United 
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  See also  Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(stating that the false mystique and “aura of trustworthiness and reliability” exist even where the expert is an 
attorney);  United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony because 
of the risk of misleading the jury); Adams v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 2 F.Supp. 2d 1077 (S.D. Ind. 1997)  (articulating 
that experts can mislead and confuse a jury), rev’d Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2000).   
Additionally, various commentators have also noted that the factfinder can be misled by expert testimony.  
See Stephen E. Fienberg et al., Understanding and Evaluating Statistical Evidence in Litigation, in 36 JURIMETRICS 
1–32 (1995) (stating that factfinders can be misled by statisticians);  E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based 
Procedure: Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 493 (1989) (claiming that factfinders 
can be misled by experts);  Robert Charrow & Veda Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A 
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1305 (1979) (arguing that reliance on jury instructions 
to help the jurors filter technical testimony may not be realistic because jurors have great difficulty understanding 
even simple jury instructions). Henceforth, the trial judge’s responsibility to ensure reliable expert testimony is 
heightened.  See Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1988).  See also  Imwinkelried, supra  note 9, at 2279 
(claiming that the trial judge’s role to ensure reliability in non-scientific testimony is just as great because this expert 
testimony is every bit as suspect as the reliability of scientific evidence).  
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her testimony.  This reliance on the expert’s testimony heightens the incentive and ability to couch an 
opinion because the judge cannot discern its fallibility.124  To avoid this problem, courts must have the 
ability to evaluate all expert testimony, regardless of its underlying basis.125 
3. Inability of the Judges to Discern Between Scientific and Non-scientific Evidence 
Kumho also eliminated the trial judge’s impossible task of differentiating between scientific 
and non-scientific evidence.126  If trial judges were asked to make that distinction, it would “prove 
difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer rules under which a “gatekeeping” obligation 
                                                 
124  See Petitioner’s Brief at 23-25, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1998) (No. 97-1709) (citing 
a National Law Journal survey on juries) (“Jurors are incapable of ‘critically evaluating the bases for an expert’s 
testimony’ and too often give unquestioning deference to expert opinion;” “it is common knowledge, moreover, that 
jurors ‘perform much less well when they sit in judgment on technology;’” “jurors often ‘abdicate their fact-finding 
obligation’ and simply ‘adopt’ the expert’s opinion”).  See also  State v. Spencer, 216 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Minn. 1974) 
(“We are concerned, however, about the sweeping and unqualified manner in which [the expert’s] testimony was 
offered.  Where expert testimony concerning a new scientific technique is heard by a jury, there is danger that the 
evidence may be given more weight than is warranted.”).  But see Brief Amici Curae of Neil Vidmar et al. at 6-19, 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1998) (No. 97-1709) (arguing that juries are capable of evaluating all 
types of expert testimony regardless of its focus).   
Additionally, numerous federal and state court judges agree with the jury’s verdict.  See Louis Harris & 
Assoc., Judge’s Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least 
Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731 (1989) (stating that ninety-eight percent of both federal 
and state judges believe that juries made a “serious effort to apply the law”);  R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,  The Georgia Jury 
and Negligence: The View From the Bench, 26 GA. L. REV. 85, 98 (1991) (according to Sentell’s survey eighty-six 
percent of judges indicated that they agreed with jury verdicts four out of five times).  Harris and Associates also 
asked judges the following question: “Would you like to see a limitation on the use of juries for . . . complex civil 
cases involving highly technical or scientific issues?”  Louis Harris & Assoc., supra , at 748.  A majority of the judges 
stated that they would not like restrictions placed on the jury trials.  Id. 
125  “[It] seems exactly backwards that experts who purport to rely on general . . . principles and practical 
experience might escape screening by the district court simply by stating that their conclusions were not reached by 
any particular method or technique.”  Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997). 
126  See Krebs, supra  note 92, at 996 (stating that the Court noted that many areas, such as engineering, may 
rest on scientific knowledge and that pure science may rest on engineered machinery; therefore, it would be difficult 
for courts to make the conceptualized distinction between scientific and non-scientific matters with any consistency). 
The Supreme Court declared that there was not a “convincing need” to make the distinction between 
scientific and non-scientific evidence.  Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999).  Moreover, the 
Court stated that every type of expert connects observations to conclusions through what Judge Learned Hand 
called “general truths derived from . . . specialized experience.”  Id. (quoting Learned Hand, Historical and Practical 
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901)). 
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depended upon a distinction between ‘scientific’127 knowledge and ‘technical’128 knowledge or 
‘other specialized’ knowledge.”129  This difficulty stems from the fact that an identifiable line does not 
always exist between scientific and non-scientific knowledge.130  Furthermore, some expert testimony 
may be a combination of both scientific and non-scientific knowledge.131  The lack of a discernible 
distinction would heighten the trial judge’s role and enlarge the “gatekeeping” function to require 
                                                 
127  “Science” can have varying definitions depending on the dictionary consulted.  See RANDOM HOUSE 
DICTIONARY 1279 (2d ed. 1983) (defining “science” as “a branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts 
or truths systematically arranged and showing the operation of general laws”);  OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 605 
(1980) (defining science as “a branch of knowledge requiring systematic study and method”);  WEBSTER’S NEW 
WORLD DICTIONARY 1305 (College ed. 1966) (defining “science” as “systematized knowledge derived from 
observations, study and experimentation carried on in order to determine the nature or principles of what is being 
studied”). 
128  Additionally, the word “technical” can also have different definitions depending on the dictionary used. 
 See RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 1458 (2d ed. 1983) (defining “technical” as “pertaining to an art, science, or the like,” 
or “characteristic of a particular art, science, profession, trade, etc.”);  OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 704 (1980) 
(defining “technical” as “of the mechanical arts and applied sciences, . . . of a particular subject or craft”); BLACK’S 
LEGAL DICTIONARY 1463 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “technical” as “belonging or peculiar to an art or profession;” 
“words of art”). 
129  Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148.  See also  Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New 
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 751 (1994) (“If lawyers and judges hope to apply the new 
Daubert test rationally, they will have to learn what distinguishes science from other forms of knowledge – what it is 
that makes science scientific.”). 
130  The difficulty in this distinction results from the lack of an identifiable line between scientific and non-
scientific evidence.  See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149  (concluding that the line between scientific and non-scientific 
evidence is unclear and “conceptual efforts to distinguish the two are unlikely to produce clear legal lines capable of 
application in particular cases”).  Therefore, in order for judges to properly effectuate their roles as gatekeepers, the 
line between scientific and non-scientific evidence must be erased.  See de Vyver, supra note 75, at 191. 
Psychology is an example illustrating the difficulty in discerning between scientific and non-scientific 
testimony.  See Krebs, supra note 92, at 995.  By its very definition, psychology is the “science of mind and 
behavior.”  MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 943 (10th ed. 1996).  Psychologists conduct experiments 
and there are standard texts and accepted methods of analysis which evince that a psychologist’s testimony is 
grounded in science.  See Krebs, supra  note 92, at 995.  However, a psychologist may also utilize observations and 
experience to reach conclusions, which are not necessarily grounded in science.  Id.  Henceforth, the totality of the 
psychologist’s testimony should be subject to the rigorous scrutiny because it would be impossible for a judge to 
separate the testimony into scientific and non-scientific segments.  Id. 
131  There is little guidance in the determination as to what is and is not science.  See Diana K. Sheiness, 
Note, Out of the Twilight Zone: The Implications of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 69 WASH. L. REV. 
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judges to parse out scientific and non-scientific aspects of testimony.132  Enlarging the judge’s role to 
include deciphering between scientific and non-scientific evidence does not support the underlying 
rationale of the “gatekeeper” function.133  Judges are not skilled in all facets of life; therefore, judges’ 
determinations would probably not be correct,134 nor would there be consistency among an 
individual judge’s conclusions and the conclusions of another judge.135  
4. Judges Should be Equally Concerned About the Reliability of Non-scientific Evidence 
 
The Court in Daubert stated that the “gatekeeper” role of the trial judge was to ensure that 
“all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”136  Restricting the 
                                                                                                                                                         
481, 491 (1994);  Dyk, supra  note 71, at 20 (“Who is a scientist?   A political scientist?  A ‘human factors expert’?”). 
132  As one court stated:  “[e]xpert opinion . . . is only an ordinary guess in evening clothes . . . .”  Earl M. 
Kerstetter, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dept. of Highways, 171 A.2d 163, 165 (Pa. 1961). 
133  See infra  note 137 and accompanying text. 
134  Originally, opposing counsel was responsible for flaws in his opponent’s expert testimony.  See Kapsa, 
supra  note 10, at 325-26.  However, now this responsibility lies with the trial judge.  Id.  This results in a problem 
because college degrees do not assure that one is thoroughly versed in scientific principles.  Id.  Moreover, attaining 
a legal license does not require judges or attorneys to attain a certain level of scientific competence.  Id.  Henceforth, 
judges rely on their individual and scientific knowledge they have gained through various college or high school 
courses  and opinions stated by other experts.  Id.  This leads to a divergence in opinions and outcomes, none of 
which are predictable.  Id.  See also generally Kapsa, supra  note 10, at 332 n.78.  The high school requirements in the 
United States require some familiarity with basic mathematical skills; however, these standards are substantially lower 
than one hundred years ago.  Id.  Thus, illustrating that judges do not have the requisite knowledge to adequately 
evaluate scientific versus non-scientific expert evidence. 
135  Judges have differing levels of intelligence and experience which leads to different conclusions.  See 
Joseph T. Walsh, Keeping the Gate, 83 JUDICATURE 140 (1999).  Additionally, with the subjective nature of the 
reliability analysis , a judge’s idiosyncracies or predisposition may affect the admissibility of expert testimony.  Id.  
Therefore, evidence which achieved admissibility in one court may not be as fortuitous in another court.  Id.   
136  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals , Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).  The judge’s “gatekeeper” role is 
also essential because cross-examination, a traditional safeguard of preventing unreliable testimony, is not as 
effective in the expert testimony arena.  See Brief of the American Tort Reform Association, American Consulting 
Engineers Council, and National Association of Manufacturers at 10-12, Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137 (1998) (No. 97-1709).  This is based on the rationale that an effective cross-examination presupposes that the 
factfinder can appreciate the weaknesses made evident through the cross-examination.  See Paul F. Rothstein, The 
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“gatekeeper” role to only scientific expert evidence creates the impression that non-scientific expert 
evidence is omnipotent and free from the heightened scrutiny.137  Moreover, this creates the aura that 
non-scientific experts are more reliable than scientific experts, which strengthens the proposition that 
experts will couch their opinions if a distinction is not drawn.138  Therefore, judges must conduct a 
                                                                                                                                                         
Collision Between New Discovery Amendments and Expert Testimony Rules, 14 LITIG. 17 (1988).  See also United 
States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Md. 1973) (“The cross-examination of an expert poses a formidable task; it 
is the rare attorney who knows as much as the expert.”);  State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 650-51 (Wis. 1981) (“Cross-
examination . . . may not in all situations provide a sufficient basis for the jury to assess the competence of the 
witness and the merits of the test.”).  
137  Conversely, by not subjecting a non-scientific expert to the rigors of the “gatekeeping” function could 
further the proposition that the court system does not fear this form of expert testimony as compared to scientific 
expert testimony.  See infra  note 139.  Therefore, the natural result is to subject only scientific expert testimony to the 
higher scrutiny.  Id. 
138  See Hansen, supra note 49, at  25.  Some commentators do believe that there should be a distinction 
between the evaluation of non-scientific evidence and scientific evidence.  See Giannelli, supra note 40, at 1237 
(stating that scientific evidence has a potential danger of misleading the jury because “an aura of scientific 
infallibility may shroud the evidence”);  Strong, supra  note 15, at 367 (noting that a distinction is needed between 
scientific and other types of experts because “propositions perceived as ‘scientific’ by the jury possess an unusually 
high degree of persuasive power”).   
Despite these commentators views, there are various reasons that the courts should be equally concerned 
with the validity of non-scientific evidence and hence, distinctions should not be created.  See generally Needham, 
supra  note 13, at 560-63.  The classification of expert testimony as “non-scientific” does not eliminate the fact that it 
is still “expert” testimony.  Id. at 561  The very fact that an expert is needed to explain or decipher information to the 
jury illustrates that this expert has some knowledge that the jury does not possess.  Id.  See also  United States v. 
Gallo, 118 F.R.D. 316, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (determining that the testimony of an expert witness concerning the 
methodology of organized crime should be admitted in order to assist the trier of fact because the “average jury . . . is 
likely to know very little about the methods of operation of organized crime . . . and in order to conduct a trial it is 
necessary that the trier of fact have a great deal of familiarity with the way the relevant institution or organization 
operates”).  Therefore, it is imperative that this testimony is subjected to a “gatekeeping” analysis to ensure that it is 
both relevant and reliable.  See Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the 
district court has the obligation to ensure that it is dealing with an expert in all cases including when the expertise is 
based on experience or training).   
Eliminating this scrutiny could lead some juries to place undue emphasis on unreliable evidence, which 
would be in contravention to the entire judicial process.  See Laser, supra  note 9, at 1407.  Moreover, if there is a 
distinction drawn between scientific and non-scientific evidence, some parties will mold the expert’s testimony to fit 
within a non-scientific category to allude Daubert’s heightened scrutiny.  See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 
1156 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting appellant’s argument that handwriting analysis constitutes scientific evidence, and is 
therefore subject to Daubert’s heightened scrutiny);  United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1036-37 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (refusing to accept opposing party’s attempt to cast forensic document expertise as scientific 
knowledge to warrant greater reliability scrutiny).   This distinction contributed to the divergence in applications of 
Daubert amongst the circuits.  See supra  notes 76, 101-102.  Also, the distinction would merely reinforce the expert’s 
ability to couch his or her opinion in non-scientific measures.  See supra  notes 119-126 and accompanying text.  But 
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reliability analysis on non-scientific evidence to prevent this evidence from coming in unguarded and 
to eliminate the presumption that non-scientific expert evidence is more worthy of belief.139  
Additionally, unlike the verifiability of scientific evidence,140 non-scientific evidence does not 
have these assurances and quality controls.141  Non-scientific expertise does not result from 
numerous experimentations, but from the expert’s life experiences, which is virtually impossible to 
                                                                                                                                                         
see Walsh, supra note 135, at 140 (arguing that the fact that the judge must serve as the “gatekeeper” to prevent the 
jury from receiving evidence that may persuade them presupposes the fact that the trial judge is more knowledgeable 
in assessing scientific evidence than the average lay juror). 
139  See Needham, supra note 13, at 559 (arguing that trial courts failure to apply their “gatekeeping” 
function to non-scientific testimony insinuates a presumption that the trial court just assumes that the expert’s 
conclusions are reliable based on their qualifications without further inquiry);  Peter B. Oh, Assessing the 
Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert Evidence Under Federal Evidence Rule 702, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 556, 563 (1997) 
(asserting that emphasizing the credentials is “misdirected,” and that, “unlike assessing the methodologies and 
principles underlying a field, examining an individual’s background provides no assurance that the expert will present 
valid views”);  Strong, supra note 15, at 363 (declaring that the result of the traditional approach to admitting expert 
testimony is that the question of reliability of the testimony is “conveniently subsumed under the question of the 
qualification of the expert witness”). 
140  J. Brook Lathram, The “Same Intellectual Rigor” Test Provides an Effective Method for Determining 
the Reliability of all Expert Testimony, Without Regard to Whether the Testimony Comprises “Scientific 
Knowledge” or “Technical or Other Specialized Knowledge,” 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 1053, 1064-65 (1998).  Lathram 
noted that: 
 
The hallmark of a scientific principle is its falsity, i.e., its amenability to being tested to see if it is  
false . . . . What distinguishes scientific from nonscientific expert testimony is the former’s 
application of general scientific (i.e., falsifiable) principles to the specific facts of a case.  The 
reliability of scientific testimony depends, in turn, on whether the general principles applied by the 
expert have been validated through appropriate testing. 
 
Id. 
141  “Experience is to nonscientific experts what experimentation is to scientists.” Imwinkelried, supra  note 9, 
at 2289.  See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Standard for Admitting Scientific 
Evidence: The United States Stands Alone, 42 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 15, 23 (1989) (stating that the nature of scientific 
evidence adds to the accuracy of the testimony because another scientist can replicate the scientific research);  L. 
Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1455 (1995) (“[N]onscientific 
expert testimony deserves even greater skepticism because there is often no ability to test the technical expert’s 
theories or techniques or to prove false the expert’s underlying premise.”).  But see Scholfield, supra note 117, at  
507-08 (declaring that all expert testimony, including non-scientific testimony, “should be logically founded upon 
some methodology, reasoning, or principle,” and “otherwise the opinion would be merely unsupported speculation”). 
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replicate because of its individualistic nature.142  Thus, it is imperative to subject non-scientific 
evidence to the “gatekeeper” function to prevent the presentation of unreliable evidence to the trier of 
fact.143                                           
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE KUMHO DECISION  
Following the Kumho decision, it is apparent that the trial judge’s “gatekeeper” role has 
expanded to include non-scientific expert testimony.144  With this expanded role, trial judges will be 
expected to entertain numerous facts and factors to determine its admissibility, a realm not previously 
entered by trial judges.145  This role provides judges with greater control of the presentation of 
                                                 
142  See supra  note 142 and accompanying text. 
143  Despite the fact that judges should be concerned about the reliability of non-scientific expert testimony, 
there are several reasons why Daubert should not apply to this type of expert testimony.  See Hansen, supra  note 49, 
at 26.  In Daubert, the Court specifically limited its opinion to scientific testimony.  Id.  By doing so, the Court 
constructed the four evaluative factors around science which limits their applicability to non-science areas.  Id.  
Thus, these factors do not assist in evaluating the reliability of non-scientific expert testimony.  Id.   
144  See supra  note 90 and accompanying text. 
145  See Hansen, supra note 49, at 40.  Trial judges evaluating non-scientific expert testimony may start at 
the Daubert factors as a base for analysis.  Id. at 41.  However, their analysis should be fact oriented, thus enabling 
the trial judge to look at a multitude of factors.  Id.  For example, in Kumho the Court illustrated the type of factual 
evaluation it expected from trial judges when proffered with a non-scientific expert.  Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).  The factors that the Court looked at were the expert’s qualifications, his 
imprecise method of inspecting the tire, his subjective mode of analysis, the short amount of time the expert spent 
examining the tire, the fact that the expert reached a preliminary conclusion before he inspected the tire, his failure to 
adequately explain other possible causes for the tire failure, and the fact that the Daubert factors did not favor 
admissibility.  Id. at 151-57. 
The court must also incorporate common sense factors into its evaluation.  Some of these common sense 
factors include: (1) whether the proffered expert is to testify about matters growing directly out of research 
independent of litigation, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,1317 (9th Cir. 1995);   
(2) whether the expert unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise, see General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 
136, 146 (1997); (3) whether the expert accounted for alternative explanations, see Claar v. Burlington N. R. Co., 29 
F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994); (4) whether the expert employed the same degree of care he would in his regular professional 
work outside the litigation, see Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997); and (5) whether 
the field of expertise is known to reach reliable results, see Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 
1988).  
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witnesses.146  By examining all expert witnesses, the judge no longer performs the difficult task of 
discerning between scientific and non-scientific evidence.147  By eliminating that task, judges can use 
this time more effectively by conducting relevancy and reliability inquiries, which in the past have only 
been given a cursory glance.148  
                                                 
146  The increased discretion provided to trial judges via the Kumho decision allows trial judges to evaluate 
every aspect of the expert’s qualifications.  See Hansen, supra  note 49, at 43.  This discretionary power of the trial 
judge’s may force litigants to realign their strategy and presentation of witnesses.  Id.  This results in more pretrial 
hearings to allow the litigants to resolve any questions pertaining to the presentation of expert witnesses.  See infra  
note 152 and accompanying text. 
147  See generally Roger D. Taylor et al., Admissibility of Expert Damages Testimony in Patent Infringement 
Cases in the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Kumho Tire Decision, 572 P.L.I./P.A.T. 783, 808-810 (1999) (outlining the 
effects of the Kumho decision on non-scientific expert testimony).   
148  To assist trial judges in determining the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony, the National 
Council on Uniform State Laws has submitted a proposed draft of a revised Federal Rules of Evidence 702, which has 
incorporated some of the Daubert factors.  See Kapsa, supra  note 10, at 329-330.  The proposed draft states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact at issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(a) General rule.  A witness may testify in the form of opinion or otherwise if the following are 
satisfied. 
(1) Basis for testimony.  The testimony is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge. 
(2) Assistance to trier of fact.  The testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand evidence or 
determine a fact at issue. 
(3) Qualification of witness.  The witness is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 
as an expert in the scientific, technical, or other specialized field. 
(4) Reasonable reliability.  The testimony is based upon principles or methodology which is 
reasonably reliable as established under subdivision (b), (c), or (e). 
(5) Reliably applied to facts of case.  The witness has applied the principles or methodology reliably to the 
facts of the case. 
(b) Reliability deemed to exist.  A principle or methodology is deemed reasonably reliable if its 
reliability has been established by controlling legislation or judicial decision. 
(c) Presumption of reliability.  A principle or methodology is presumed to be reasonably reliable if it 
has substantial acceptance within the relevant scientific, technical, or specialized community.  A 
party may rebut the presumption by proving that it is more probable than not that the principle or 
methodology is not reasonably reliable as provided in subdivision (e).   
(d) Presumption of unreliability.  A principle or methodology is presumed not to be reasonably 
reliable if it does not have substantial acceptance within the relevant scientific, technical, or 
specialized community.  A party may rebut the presumption if it is more probable than not that the 
principle or methodology is reasonably reliable as provided in subdivision (e). 
(e) Other reliability factors.  When determining the reliability of a principle or methodology, the 
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The impact of Kumho stretches beyond the judge’s role; it also affects the litigator’s role.149  
Litigators will have a heightened responsibility and freedom to provide reliability factors to 
corroborate their expert’s testimony.  Furthermore, litigators will be more willing to attack the 
credibility of a non-scientific expert witness as unreliable.150  This offensive role by the litigators will 
require more pretrial motions and motions in limine to determine the reliability of an expert.151   
                                                                                                                                                         
court shall consider all relevant additional factors, which may include: 
(1) Testing.  The extent to which the principle or methodology has been tested; 
(2) Research methods.  The adequacy of research methods employed in testing the principle or 
methodology; 
(3) Peer review.  The extent to which the principle or methodology has been published and 
subjected to peer review; 
(4) Rate of error.  The rate of error in the application of the principle or methodology; 
(5) Experience of expert.  The experience of the witness as an expert in the application of the 
principle of methodology; and 
(6) Acceptance within the field.  The extent to which the field of knowledge has substantial acceptance 
within the relevant scientific, technical, or specialized community. 
 
Id. (quoting the Proposed FED. R. EVID. 702, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Evidence). 
149  See infra  notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
150  See Hansen, supra  note 49, at 45.  The expansive nature of the “gatekeeping” function will allow 
litigators to be more creative when creating arguments either for or against the admissibility of an expert witness.  Id.  
Moreover, it will force litigators to explore all possible factors to promote their witness because opposing counsel will 
also have the benefits of utilizing more abstract factors.  Id. This situation will force litigators to become more familiar 
with the methodologies used by experts to more effectively litigate the case.  Id.    
151  When judges conduct pretrial hearings to determine the admissibility of evidence, Professor 
Imwinkelried has outlined five possible results.  See HUGH B. KAPLAN, Scholars Discuss Judge’s Role, Combating 
“Junk Science” in Wake of Kumho Decision, THE CRIMINAL PRACTICE REPORTER, May 19, 1999, at 194-95 (quoting 
Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried).  The possible results are as follows: (1) the proponent does not produce any 
evidence that the expert’s hypothesis can be empirically validated; (2) the proponent does not produce sufficient 
evidence that the expert’s hypothesis can be empirically validated; (3) the proponent barely meets the burden of 
submitting enough evidence to show that the expert’s hypothesis has been tes ted by sound methodology; (4) the 
proponent provides sufficient evidence and the opponent provides contrary evidence, however the opponent’s 
evidence is not strong enough to overcome accepting the proponent’s hypothesis; and (5) the proponent provides 
barely enough evidence and the opponent provides strong evidence that it would be irrational to accept the 
proponent’s hypothesis.  Id. 
The trial judge’s determination is not an easy task.  See Hansen, supra  note 49, at 44.  Therefore, in an effort 
to assist the judge, the litigators should provide the judge with detailed briefs covering the expert’s methodologies 
and conclusions.  Id.  The briefs should also contain the litigators’ rationale as to why the expert is reliable or 
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Additionally, the increased scrutiny that non-scientific experts are now forced to endure may 
have the effect of precluding evidence that was routinely admitted prior to the expansive 
“gatekeeper” function.152  Although Kumho may have a detrimental effect on some non-scientific 
evidence, it has opened the door to the admissibility of novel evidence and prevents unreliable 
evidence from reaching the trier of fact.153  Furthermore, Kumho’s expansion of Daubert provides 
                                                                                                                                                         
unreliable.  Id.  The trial judges should also require the litigators to produce the expert at the pretrial hearing.  Id.  This 
will allow the judge to create a factual record and conduct a proper factual inquiry.  Id.  These procedures should be 
incorporated into the trial judge’s determination of reliability to illustrate to the appellate court that he or she has not 
abused his or her discretion in reaching the reliability conclusion.  Id. 
152  See Hansen, supra  note 49, at 47.  The Kumho decision may lead to the exclusion of some non-scientific 
expert testimony that would not have been excluded prior to Kumho; however, it is too early to state with conviction 
that this will be the result.  Id.  Commentators believe that the exclusion of expert testimony will primarily affect the 
areas of handwriting analysis, fingerprints, arson investigations, psychological testing, accident reconstruction, and 
various other areas.  HUGH B. KAPLAN, Evidence Speakers Offer Guidance in Combating Bad Science, Misuse of 
Expert Testimony, THE CRIMINAL PRACTICE REPORTER, Apr. 7, 1999, at 235.  See also  United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 
278 (1999); United States v. Brown, 49 M.J. 448 (1998); United States v. Rivers, 49 M.J. 434 (1998) (listing other areas 
where the courts may exclude evidence which would generally have been admitted: psychiatric testimony, 
psychological profiling, syndrome evidence, false identification testimony, and false confession testimony).   
United States v. Hines, a post-Kumho case, illustrates that the judges may be taking a closer look at 
evidence than they previously did before Kumho.  55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 62 (D. Mass. 1999).  In Hines, the judge excluded 
portions of a handwriting expert’s testimony because it failed the reliability ruling.  Id. at 63. The judge stated that 
prior to Kumho the evidence was routinely admitted, but the subsequent rulings in Daubert and Kumho forced her to 
conclude that the testimony has serious problems with issues such as empirical testing and rate of error.  Id.  
153  The Court stated: 
 
It might not be surprising in a particular case; for example, that a claim made by a scientific 
witness has never been the subject of peer review, for a particular application at issue may 
never previously have interested any scientist.  Nor, on the other hand, does the presence 
of Daubert’s general acceptance factor help show that an expert testimony is reliable 
where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories granted in any so-
called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy. 
   
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).  See also  KAPLAN, supra  note 151, at 219 (stating all of 
the areas that may be affected as a result of the increased scrutiny).   
But see Hansen, supra  note 49, at 48.  Although many commentators believe that Kumho may have a 
detrimental effect on the areas of fingerprint evidence, handwriting analysis, document analysis, crash scene 
investigation evidence, and other forensic evidence, the exact impact of Kumho is uncertain.  Id.  Moreover, these 
areas have enjoyed such a long history of admissibility that it is unlikely that the judge will usurp their status merely 
because of his or her expanded role.  Id.  Most likely, the judge will declare that a detailed examination is not 
necessary because the reliability of the methods can be taken for granted.  Id.   
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trial judges with more discretion to evaluate expert testimony by permitting them to examine a 
multitude of factors beyond those enunciated in Daubert in order to establish the expert’s reliability 
and the admissibility of his or her testimony.154 
V. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the years, the admissibility of expert testimony has encountered numerous 
deviations155 and has posed a plethora of questions.156  Finally, it appears as though the Court has 
tamed some of the uncertainties plaguing this area by expanding the “gatekeeper” function to include 
non-scientific expert testimony.157  
 To say that the Court merely expanded the “gatekeeper” function would oversimplify the 
powerful role that the Supreme Court has bestowed upon trial judges.  Judges must ensure the 
integrity of the judicial system by providing the trier of fact with reliable and relevant evidence in 
every facet of expert testimony.158  Judges must perform this role with vigor to prevent another twist 
or turn in the already crooked path of admitting expert testimony.  
Leslie Morsek 
                                                 
154  Although Kumho provides trial judges with more discretion, it too has its problems.  See Latham, supra  
note 104, at 19.  Greater judicial discretion creates uncertainty for litigants and more “wiggle room” for zealous 
litigators arguing for or against the admissibility of a particular expert’s testimony.  Id. 
155  See supra  notes 37-43, 51, 62-71 and accompanying text. 
156  See supra  notes 15, 56, 72-75 and accompanying text. 
157  See supra  notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
158  See supra  notes 90, 95 and accompanying text. 
43
Morsek: Scientific and Non-Scientifc Expert Evidence
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001
